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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS FLOWS
TO AND FROM CHINA *
DR. ROSALINA TAN **
ABSTRACT
The study traces the growth of direct foreign investment (DFI) inflows in
China, and its distribution by sector, receiving regions and source countries.  It also
looks into the trends and patterns of Chinese outward direct investments.  Direct
investment flows into China are shown to be significantly affected by China's GDP
growth rate, wage rate and exchange rate as well as the world's GDP growth rate.
Policy factors play a catalytic role. China's overseas direct investment, likewise,
appear to be influenced by home country (e.g.: Chinese government policies, Chinese
competitive advantage) and host country (e.g., market considerations, cost and price
factors, and receiving countries' policies) variables. The study has also shown that the
massive flows of inward DFIs h ve significantly contributed to China's capital
formation and export performance. Furthermore, the improved shares of China as well
as the ASEAN-4 countries in the global supply of DFIs do not indicate a crowding-
out effect. Two-way DFI flows between China and ASEAN countries, particularly
Thailand and Malaysia, have become increasingly important since the early 1990s.
* This study is part of the research project “China and Its Implication to the Asia-
Pacific” funded in whole by the Philippine APEC Study Center Network.
** The Author is from the Japanese Studies Program of the Ateneo de Manil  University
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objectives of Chinese authorities in opening the country's door to foreign
investors were many-fold.  Taking off from a very low inc me base in 1979, domestic
savings were not sufficient to fuel growth.  Nor were its reserves of foreign exchange
adequate to finance imports of capital goods and production inputs necessary to
increase productivity and expand output. Foreign investors were also expected to
introduce new management and production technologies that would make China
internationally competitive. Further, the promotion of foreign investments,
particularly in export-oriented sectors, was aimed at ensuring, not just one-time, but a
continuing flow of foreign exchange into the country.
Since the enactment of the Equity Joint Venture Law in 1979, big wav s of
foreign investments has arrived in China. From 1979 to the end of 1996, a total of
US$ 175 trillion capital had actually been invested in China by foreign entities. The
rate of growth of DFI was extremely impressive - an annual average of 57 percent in
terms of contract amount and 45 percent in terms of utilized amount. By 1996,
inflows of direct foreign investments were 275 times of 1983's level.
A number of internal and external factors contributed to this remarkable
record. Opportunities offered by China's potentially expansive market was an
important drawing force for direct foreign investments. The market size factor
represented by the rate of growth of the Chinese economy was shown to have a
statistically significant positive effect on inward DFI in China. China's abundant
supply of low cost labor was a pull factor for the early small- to medium-scale export-
oriented overseas Chinese investors. th  regres i n analysis further revealed that the
devaluation of the renminbi had a significant positive effect on DFI. The favorable
influence of economic-related variables in China was greatly enhanced by policy
variables. Policy played a catalytic role in attracting foreign investors to China. the
package of incentives offered to foreign investors in special zones matched and even
surpassed those offered by competing economies such as the ASEAN-4. Chinese
authorities manifested such sensitivity to the needs of foreign investors Liberalization
of trade and foreign exchange policies in China had evolved largely in response to and
in accordance with the concerns of the DFI.
External factors were likewise at play in the investment boom in China.
Economic conditions in the source countries dictated the available supply of funds for
outward investments. As a general indicator of this factor, world GDP growth rate
was included as one explanatory variable in the DFI equation. the r lationship turned
out to be strongly positive. A sizeable proportion of investments in China came from
Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea. The accumulation of trade surpluses in these
countries in the late 1980s up to the early 1990s made available the foreign exchange
that was recycled into DFI outflows to China. These capi al movements were
facilitated by improved political relations of the primary source countries with China.
A host of other non-economic and non-policy factors explained foreign
investments in China as well. Historical, cultural and geographic affinity made the
transaction costs of business in the Mainland lower for overseas Chinese. This was a
relevant motivational factor for investments from Hongkong and Taiwan which
accounted for 60 to 70 percent of DFIs in China as well as for the ethnic Chinese
investors which comprised a significant portion of investments from the ASEAN.
The impressive export performance of China, an annual growth rate of 17
percent, was contributed largely by foreign investors, whose export receipts grew by
74 percent per year. In 1996, foreign-funded enterprises produced nearly half of total
Chinese exports, a big leap from their share of less than 1 percent in 1985.A
spectacular build-up of capital has also taken place in China since the foreign
investors arrived. Gross capital formation expanded at a rate of 23 percent per year.
About 13 percent of these capital expenditures were undertaken by foreign-funded
enterprises in the 1990s, a sharp improvement in from the negligible share of 0.3
percent during the early years of the "Open-Door" policy. It was also shown
statistically that capital formation particularly by DFIs has a significant positive effect
on GDP growth of China which posted double-digit rates in most of the "open-door"
years. These growth records were translated into 5.4 million higher paid jobs in FFEs
which made up for contracting employment in state-owned enterprises and urban
collectives.
There are no indicators that DFIs in C ina have crowded-out DFIs in the
ASEAN-4. The much improved share of China in the global supply of DFI has not
been accompanied by the reduction in the shares of the ASEAN-4, nor of all
developing countries as a group but as of the industrial countries. The greater
magnitude of the increase in China's share relative to the magnitude of the drop in the
industrial countries' share and the positive change in the global supply of DFI are
indicative of new stocks of DFI generated by China's "Open-Door" policy. Moreover,
China's opening has presented new opportunities for the ASEAN-4. Two-way DFI
flows between China and the two ASEAN countries, Thailand and Malaysia, became
important in the early 990s during which all three economies were in the
expansionary trend. Remarkably, complementation in several respects, namely,
material endowment labor skills, technology and market needs have been found.
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1Introduction
The Equity Joint Venture Law was enacted in 1979 to address two constraints
to China's pursuit of economic growth.  China's very low income base could not
generate the amount of domestic savings that would be adequate to fuel a growth
trend that would improve the living standards of the people.  Second, having limited
its economic contact with the outside world for more than thirty years, China barely
had the foreign exchange necessary for the importation of capital goods and other
production inputs.  Direct foreign investments offer a single solution to this twin
problem.  Through direct foreign investments, foreign savings are channeled into
China to bridge the domestic investment-savings gap.  The inflow of direct foreign
capital likewise generates the supply of foreign exchange to finance acquisition of
imported capital goods and materials.  Direct foreign investments were pursued over
other forms of capital inflows such as foreign borrowing for two reasons.   First, the
entry of foreign firms into China was expected to result in the importation of new
technology in both management and production as well as the introduction of new
products.   Second, by encouraging specifically foreign investments in export-oriented
undertakings, continuous inflows of foreign exchange could be assured.
The study looks at the structure, determinants and impact of direct foreign
investment flows to and from China since the start of its “Open-Door” policy.  The
first chapter traces the growth of direct foreign investment inflows in China, and its
distribution by sector, receiving regions and source countries, and the type of
arrangement.  The chapter also discusses the trends and patterns of Chinese outward
direct investments.   The next chapter looks at the determinants and motivations for
direct foreign investments. Indicators for the share of China in the global supply of
investments are presented and factors contributing to this share are identified.
Motivations for Chinese outward investments are likewise discussed.  Chapter III
analyzes the effects of inward investments in China on its exports, capital
accumulation, employment and income growth.  The last chapter summarizes the
findings of the study and discusses the implications of these investment flows on the
ASEAN-4 countries—the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
ITrends and Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment Flows
To and From China
1. Inward Direct Foreign Investments
1.1 General Trends
The Equity Joint Venture Law was enacted in 1979 to address two constraints
to China's pursuit of economic growth.  China's very low income base could not
generate the amount of domestic savings that would be adequate to fuel a growth
trend that would improve the living standards of the people.  Second, having limited
its economic contact with the outside world for more than thirty years, China barely
had the foreign exchange necessary for the importation of capital goods and other
production inputs.  Direct foreign investments offer a single solution to this twin
problem.  Through direct foreign investments, foreign savings are channeled into
China to bridge the domestic investment-savings gap.  The inflow of direct foreign
capital likewise generates the supply of foreign exchange to finance acquisition of
imported capital goods and materials.  Direct foreign investments were pursued over
other forms of capital inflows such as foreign borrowing for two reasons.   First, the
entry of foreign firms into China was expected to result in the importation of new
technology in both management and production as well as the introduction of new
products.   Second, by encouraging specifically foreign investments in export-oriented
undertakings, continuous inflows of foreign exchange could be assured.
With the 1979 Joint Venture Law, the doors of China were opened to  foreign
investors after more than three decades of isolation.  To create an environment
conducive to foreign business operations, five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were
developed.  The first four, located in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, were
proclaimed in 1980.  The fifth and the largest was established in Hainan in 1987.  To
facilitate export and import activities,  f urteen coastal port cities were opened.
Moreover, coastal Economic Development Zones (EDZs) as well as inland
development areas were established.  From 1979 to 1996, a total of 283,254 contracts
were approved.   During this period, substantial amounts of foreign capital had flowed
into China despite the rather volatile rate at which they entered the country.  On the
basis of contracts, the approved amount of direct foreign investments reached a total
of U.S. $ 469 billion.
Pledged investment amounts were rather moderate during the first five years
of implementation of the Joint Venture Law.    Most of these involved Hong Kong
investors and were concentrated in the SEZs.    Investors from other countries were
initially reluctant to penetrate the Chinese economy due to the uncertainties with
regard to the business climate.   There were no rules to clearly delineate the
parameters within which foreign and private businesses could operate.    And even if
the rules already existed, there was insufficient information about them.   This lack of
transparency in the private business legal framework necessitated prolonged and
protracted negotiations between the Chinese and foreign partners on every small
detail of the agreements which discouraged many potential foreign investors.
Recognizing the problem, Chinese authorities formulated a series of Joint
Venture Regulations in 1983 and 1984.  Guidelines on land use fees and other
business charges, for instance, were established for the first time.  As the new rules
reduced business uncertainties, large transnational corporations such as Peugeot and
Volkswagen headed to China which triggered a bandwagon effect among American
and Western firms as well as investors from capital-rich Asian countries.  Hence,
from only 470 in 1983, the number of joint venture contracts quadrupled to 1,856 in
1984.   Entry of foreign capital in terms of the contract amount accelerated in 1984
and 1985 during which pledged amounts grew remarkably  by 53 percent and 124
percent, respectively.
The upward trend in pledged direct investments in terms of both number and
value of contracts was abruptly reversed in 1986.   In 1984-1985, foreign businesses
were in a rush to become part of the investment boom in China and as a consequence,
failed to give adequate attention to details of the joint venture negotiations.
Inevitably, problems soon emerged and frustration and disappointment grew as
expectations were not met.  As news of difficulties and conflicts in the joint venture
negotiations spread quickly, the enthusiasm of other prospective foreign investors
dwindled.   Growing corruption in government and loss of macroeconomic control
aggravated the pessimism.    Thus, pledged investments in 1986 were reduced to even
less than half of the 1985 level.
The Chinese hosts, however, were not slow to act on the problem.  Determined
to accommodate more foreign-owned enterprises, the Chinese authorities approved in
October 1986 twenty-two provisions to encourage foreign investments.   These
included tax privileges, preferential land use fees and other incentives.  Decision-
making with respect to smaller joint ventures were decentralized thereby reducing red
tape.  More importantly, a solution to China’s inconvertible currency1 was presented
by allowing joint ventures to exchange foreign currency at negotiated rates.   Further,
the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Ventures which signaled official approval of 100
percent foreign entities was passed.  The offshoot of all these reforms was a renewed
and more firmly anchored foreign investment expansion in China.  In 1987 and 1988,
approved direct investments grew by 31 and 43 percent, respectively.  The growth
slowed in 1989 and 1990 due to the political upheaval caused by the outbreak of the
students' pro-democracy movement in Beijing in the summer of 1989 wh ch
culminated in the T annamen Square incident of June 1989.  Because of the Chinese
government's violent suppression of the movement, a number of Western countries
imposed economic sanctions on China in 1989.
With the lifting of economic sanctions by France in 1990, the economic and to
some extent, the political environment in China gradually normalized.  Between 1990
and 1993, China recorded uninterrupted and significant growth in pledged
investments.   From only U.S. $ 6.6 billion in 1990, pledged investments surged to
U.S. $ 111.7 billion in 1993.  The unprecedented investment boom in the early 1990s
can be attributed to several factors.   First, regulations concerning foreign investors
                                      
1 China’s inconvertible currency was a major problem for joint ventures in the mid-1980s,
especially those producing for the domestic market and hence not earning foreign exchange.  Sourcing
of foreign exchange for the purchase of imported goods and repatriation of profits was difficult.  The
issue occupied center stage with the dispute between American Motors and the Chinese authorities with
regard to Beijing Jeep.
had been sufficiently codified by the start of the 1990s.  Second, liberalization of the
foreign exchange and financial markets continued, albeit gradually, and in 1994 , the
dual-currency system was abolished. Third, sectoral restr ctions on foreign direct
investments were also loosened.   Previously restricted sectors, namely, finance, retail
and construction, were opened up.  Huge foreign capital went into the real estate
boom of 1992-1993.  These years also witnessed the opening of branches of foreign
banks and fashion and food retail outlets.
In addition to the above-mentioned internal developments,  external factors
contributed to the surge of foreign investments into China in 1991-1993. Hong Kong
investors were joined by large waves of investments from  Taiwan and Sou h Korea
as political constraints in dealing with China were substantially reduced in these two
countries.   Taiwanese were finally permitted by their government to transact business
with the Mainland.  South Korea, on the other hand, established diplomatic links with
China.  Economic conditions in the two countries were highly favorable for outward
investment flows.  With continuing surpluses in Taiwan’s current account, foreign
exchange reserves accumulated.  This excess supply of foreign exchange and capita
easily found their way into China immediately after political restrictions were eased.
The economic motivation that governed the behavior of the Taiwanese and South
Korean investors were the same as that of the Hong Kong investors.  Their objective
was to utilize China’s big pool of low-cost labor and combine it with their production
and marketing expertise to realize profits.  Flows from other Asian countries likewise
fuelled the investment boom in China in the 1990s.  Excess supplies of foreign
exchange in Japan arising from huge trade surpluses and the appreciation of the Yen
were recycled into direct investment outflows from the second half of the 1980s.
Prior to the 1990s, however, much of this Japanese capital was going to Southeast
Asian countries.  It was only in the early 1990s that Japan became cognizant of the
potential of China.
The investment boom in the early 1990s was followed by an intense
overheating of the Chinese economy.  This necessitated stabilization efforts which
were accordingly initiated in mid-1993 but prematuredly relaxed later that year after
some initial success. The consequent resurgence of inflation prompted the Chinese
authorities to resume and intensify efforts to achieve macroeconomic stability.  This
explains  the drop in  pledged foreign investments  in 1994 and 1996 and the
relatively weak rebound in 1995  which had made the 1993 investment peak in China
unsurpassed until 1996.    The decline in approved foreign investments in 1994 was
also largely because of the government's policy to restrain the construction boom.
Foreign investment inflows into China were relatively more stable in terms of
actual amounts invested.   From the inception of the foreign investment law to 1996,
direct foreign capital inflows continuously posted positive growth, averaging 45
percent per year.   As in the contract amount,  the most significant expansion took
place in the early 1990s, specifically 1992 and 1993 during which period actual
foreign investments grew 6-fold to U.S. $ 27.5 billion from only U.S. $ 4.4 billion in
1991.  Despite declines in pledged investments, actual investments continued to
register strong gains in the succeeding years.   In 1996, foreign capital inflows
amounted to U.S. $ 41.7 billion.   And at the end of that year, the cumulative amount
of utilized direct foreign investments in China reached a total of U.S. $ 174.9 billion.
Table I.1 Direct Foreign Investments in China
Contract Amount Utilized Amount
Year
Number
of
Contracts
US $
Millions
% Growth
Rate
US $
Millions
% Growth
Rate
Ratio (%)
Contract
to Utilized
Amount
1979-1982 922 6,010 - 1,166 - 19.4
1983 470 1,732 - 636 - 36.7
1984 1,856 2,651 53.1 1,258 97.8 47.5
1985 3,073 5,932 123.8 1,661 32.0 28.0
1986 1,498 2,834 -52.2 1,874 12.8 66.1
1987 2,233 3,709 30.9 2,314 23.5 62.4
1988 5,945 5,297 42.8 3,194 38.0 60.3
1989 5,779 5,600 5.7 3,392 6.2 60.6
1990 7,273 6,596 17.8 3,487 2.8 52.9
1991 12,97811,977 81.6 4,366 25.2 36.5
1992 48,76458,124 385.3 11,007 152.1 18.9
1993 83,347111,736 92.2 27,515 150.0 24.6
1994 47,54982,680 -26.0 33,767 22.7 40.8
1995 37,01191,282 10.4 37,521 11.1 41.1
1996 24,55673,276 -19.7 41,726 11.2 56.9
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
The last column of Table 1 gives the ratio of the amount of investments as
stated in the contracts to the actual amount invested.  On the average, about 44
percent of the contract amount was turned into actual investments.  The rate at which
agreed investments were realized exceeded 60 percent in 1986 to 1989.  It was highest
(66 percent) in 1986, the year the amount of foreign investments in new contracts
dropped by more than 50 percent.  The same can be observed of the decreases in
contract amounts in 1994 and 1996.   In these two years, the ratio of realized
investments to the contract amount was notably higher than the average for the whole
period.
1.2 Sectoral Distribution
The biggest recipient of direct foreign investments in China is Industry.  This
is in line with the thrust of the development strategy of the government.  Two major
obstacles in China's path to economic growth are its inadequate supplies of domestic
savings and foreign exchange.  These two constraints are addressed through the
participation of foreign investors in export-oriented industries.  The substantial share
of Industry also reflects the concern and interest of the majority investors who are the
overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan.   These investors are more into small- to
medium-scale manufacturing entities producing for exports.
In 1991, 9 out of 10 foreign investors went to Industry.  In that year, 11,620
joint venture contracts were finalized for Industry.   In terms of the contracted amount
of investments, Industry accounted for about  80 p rcent of the total.    Trailing way
behind were all the other sectors.  Though Real Estate, Public Utilities and Services’
share was only 3 percent in terms of number of contracts, in terms of investment
amount it accounted for a significant 12 percent, implying higher capitalization in this
sector.
The share of Industry was reduced substantially but remained the highest in
1993.  Its share fell slightly below 50 percent in terms of value of investments.  A
substantial part of its previous share was taken away by Real Estate, Public Utilities
and Services  which accounted for almost 40 percent of the amount of investments.
This figure reflected the boom in hotel, infrastructure and housing complex
development in China during this period.    Corresponding to this was the increased
share of Construction in terms of both number and amount of contracts.  Also notable
was the improved share of Commerce, Food Services, Material Supply and
Marketing.
The slow-down in investments in real estate and infrastructure development,
helped by government straightforward efforts to discourage and limit them and
redirect foreign capital to export-oriented manufacturing concerns, led to the much
reduced share of the sector, as well as that of the related sector Construction in 1996.
These shares were regained by Industry.   Though still lower than in 1991, the share
of Industry climbed to two-thirds of total direct foreign investments in 1996.
Not much change can be observed in the shares of Agriculture and Forestry,
and Transportation and Telecommunications.
Table I.3 shows the extent of foreign participation in terms of registered
capital in the different sectors.   About 61 percent of total registered capital of all
enterprises with foreign capital in 1993 was contributed by the foreign partner.    The
last column of the table indicates that the ratios for the individual sectors do not
deviate substantially from the over-all average.  Foreign participation was highest for
Real Estate, Public Utilities and Services where foreign equity was around 69 percent
of registered capital.  The lowest ratio of 57 percent was posted by Industry.   As
mentioned earlier, Indust y was dominated by overseas Chinese investors who had
more connections in the Mainland and who were more open to greater Chinese
participation.
1.3 Geographical Distribution
There has not been a significant redistribution of foreign direct investments
between the open coastal cities and the interior regions over the years.    In 1983, 178
out of 188 joint ventures equivalent to 98 percent of the total amount of investments
were located in Beijing and the open coastal areas.    103 of these or about half in
terms of the investment amount were in the four special economic zones (SEZs),
namely, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong, and Xiamen in Fujian.
Shenzhen alone cornered 87 of these enterprises with foreign capital or about a fourth
of the total value of direct foreign capital inflow in that year.  The inland regions, on
the other hand, only had ten of these joint ventures, accounting for a mere 2 percent of
total foreign investments.2
                                      
2 Almanac of China’s Economy (1984), second table on p. 339 in L gChucai’s article entitled
“Joint Ventures Involving Chinese and Foreign Capital in China”.
Table I.2 Direct Foreign Investments in China by Sector (Contract Amount)
1991 1993 1996Sector
Number Value
US $ M
Number Value
US $ M
Number Value
US $ M
Agriculture, Forestry,
Animal Husbandry, Fishery &
Water Conservancy
310 198 1,741 1,228 812 1,139
Industry 11,620 8,593 56,36550,737 18,28050,486
Construction 67 122 3,062 3,544 387 2,001
Transportation, Post
&Telecommunication Services
64 95 852 1,382 196 1,599
Commerce, Food
Services, Material
Supply & Marketing
240 190 5,238 5,051 1,655 2,346
Real Estate, Public Utilities &
Services
374 1,336 11,55142,557 1,961 12,850
Other Sectors 235 263 3,993 4,441 1,265 2,854
Total 12,91010,797 82,802108,94024,55673,275
Shares in Percent
Agriculture, Forestry,
Animal Husbandry,
Fishery & Water
Conservancy
2.4 1.8 2.1 1.1 3.3 1.6
Industry 90.0 79.6 68.1 46.6 74.4 68.9
Construction 0.5 1.1 3.7 3.3 1.6 2.7
Transportation, Post
&Telecommunication Services
0.5 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.8 2.2
Commerce, Food
Services, Material
Supply & Marketing
1.9 1.8 6.3 4.6 6.7 3.2
Real Estate, Public Utilities &
Services
2.9 12.4 14.0 39.1 8.0 17.5
Other Sectors 1.8 2.4 4.8 4.1 5.2 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1998, Statistic-Utilization of Foreign Capital
By 1987, the share of the inland regions had improved to 14 percent while the
share of Beijing and the coastal regions was  reduced to 86 percent. Since 1987,
however, the share of Beijing and the coastal areas had almost not changed to give
way for more foreign investments in the interior regions.    In 1996, 84 percent of total
foreign capital was still being directed towards Beijing and the open coastal cities and
provinces.
Table I.3 Capitalization of Registered Enterprises with Foreign Capital by
Sector, 1993
Sector Registered
Capital
US $ M
Foreign
Capital
US $ M
Ratio (%)
Foreign to
Registered
Capital
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry,
Fishery & Water Conservancy
3,813 2,462 64.57
Industry 147,476 84,026 56.98
Geological Survey & Exploration35 20 57.14
Construction 4,902 3,284 66.99
Transportation, Post &
Telecommunication Services
4,628 2,826 61.06
Commerce, Food Services,
Material Supply & Marketing
12,157 7,496 61.66
Real Estate, Public Utilities & Services67,015 46,431 69.28
Other Sectors 5,605 3,637 64.89
Total 245,631150,18261.14
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1996
A change in the distribution, however, was taking place within the coastal
regions.  In the 1980s, foreign direct investors were heavily concentrated in the four
original SEZs, three of which including Shenzhen, the biggest, were in Guangdong.
Nearly half of realized direct foreign investments in the 1980s went to Guangdong.
Though the province’s share had been greatly reduced in the 1990s, it had remained to
be   the recipient of the biggest slice of the DFI pie in China.  Guand ng’s lead
position was due to a large extent to the performance of  he two SEZs,Shenzhen and
Zhuhai.  Initially, the surge of foreign investments in these two SEZs came from
overseas Chinese in Hong Kong.  These involved small investments in labor-intensive
manufactured goods for exports.  Heavy inve tments in infrastructure as well as
positive attitude of local officials and the workforce towards DFI in Shenzhen and
Zhuhai also attracted larger joint ventures in less labor-intensive industries and
transnational companies from Japan, the United States and European countries, the
types of investments that initially would only go to either Beijing, China’s capital and
first industrial base or to Shanghai, a coastal city second to Beijing as an international
and industrial center.
The third SEZ in Guangdong, Shantou, was less successful as it was not as
strategically located as Shenzhen and Zhuhai.   The success of Shenzhen  and Zhuhai
as a production base for labor-intensive manufactured goods for exports typical of
direct investments from Hong Kong spread as well to other parts of Guangdong,
particularly the areas in the inner Pearl River Delta: Baoan, Zhongshan, Dongguan,
Shunde and Nanhai.  Dongguan, for instance, became the leading center for export
processing in China.
Table I.4 Direct and Other Foreign Investments in China by Province/City of
Destination (Utilized Amount)
Province/City 1987 1990 1993 1996
Value in US $ Millions
Beijing 106 279 667 1,553
Coastal 1,436 2,873 22,093 33,797
   Tianjin 133 37 524 2,153
   Shanghai 214 174 3,160 3,941
   Liaoning 91 257 1,279 1,738
   Hebei 10 44 397 830
   Shandong 65 186 1,874 2,634
   Jiangsu 86 134 2,844 5,210
   Fujian 55 320 2,867 4,085
   Guangdong 737 1,582 7,556 11,754
   Hainan - 103 707 789
   Guangxi 45 36 885 663
Interior Region241 284 4,582 6,530
Total 1,783 3,436 27,342 41,880
Shares in Percent
Beijing 5.9 8.1 2.4 3.7
Coastal 80.5 83.6 80.8 80.7
   Tianjin 7.5 1.1 1.9 5.1
   Shanghai 12.0 5.1 11.6 9.4
   Liaoning 5.1 7.5 4.7 4.1
   Hebei 0.6 1.3 1.5 2.0
   Shandong  3.6 5.4 6.9 6.3
   Jiangsu 4.8 3.9 10.4 12.4
   Fujian 3.1 9.3 10.5 9.8
   Guangdong 41.3 46.0 27.6 28.1
   Hainan - 3.0 2.6 1.9
   Guangxi 2.5 1.0 3.2 1.6
Interior 13.5 8.3 16.8 15.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
In the 1990s, the dominance of Guangdong as a site for foreign investors
diminished remarkably.  From 46 percent in 1990, its share to total direct foreign
investments fell to only 28 percent in 1996.  This shift was brought about by a number
of factors.  One was the high wage ra es in Shenzhen and Zhuhai and other parts of
the province where economic growth had proceeded very rapidly.3  Anoth r was the
                                      
3 In 1985, Shenzhen’s wage index of 310.0 and Zhuhai’s 250.0 were the highest in China.  The
indices for the other two SEZs, Xiamen and Shantou, were 165.0 and 140.0, respectively.  Guanzhou,
also in Guangdong, had the third highest wage index of 179.5 while Shanghai’s index was 153.7.   (B.
Li and D. Spinanger, The Economic Policy Environment and Foreign Direct Investment in the PRC:
1979-1985, Pacific Rim Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, July 1988, p. III.28.)
increasing effort of other regions, especially those in the coastal areas with similar
locational advantages as Guangdong, to attract foreign investors by offering similar
incentives.   The reduced share of Guangdong in foreign investments  could also be a
reflection of the emerging ability of the local firms in the province to provide the
inputs previously provided by foreign investors and of greater use of other forms of
cooperation with foreigners.4
Foreign investors' attention shifted to the other coastal provinces, namely,
Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong and Hebei, as these provinces began to offer investment
incentives and a business climate comparable to the SEZs.  Fujian, lying next to
Guangdong and origin of many overseas Chinese, saw its share in DFI more than
tripled from 3 percent in 1987 to 10 percent in 1996.    From only 5 percent in 1987,
Jiangsu was able to c pture 12 percent of DFI in 1996.  Shandong and Hebei’s
shares, on the other hand, expanded from 4 to 6 percent and from 1 to 2 percent,
respectively, during the same period.
Fujian is the site of Xiamen, the fourth SEZ.  Xiamen's pull factors for foreign
investors came from its  industrial base and good harbor.   Its proximity to Taiwan
and the resemblance of its dialect to that of Taiwan made Xiamen an attractive
location for Taiwanese investors.  In the 1980s, Taiwanese citizens were prohibited
from engaging in business and economic relations with China.   The easing of this
restriction in the 1990s led to massive flows of Taiwanese capital into Xiamen.
Foreign capital flows to Jiangsu, likewise, did not peak until the 1990s.
Despite the extent of indus rial  acitivity in the province, Jiangsu had the largest
provincial product accounting for about 10 percent of China’s output and the south-
west part of the province was the light-industrial heartland of China, it   seized only a
small share of DFI in the 1980s.  Two joint venture contracts were approved in 1981,
one in 1982 and another in 1983 but only two became operational before the end of
1983. The foreign investment boom of 1984-1985 brought more foreign entrepreneurs
to Jiangsu.  The number of joint ventures in operation, however, remained low at
thirty by the end of 1986.  Foreign investors’ attention started to be diverted to
Jiangsu from Guangdong in 1987-1988 so that by the end of 1988 over 175 joint
ventures were operational.5   This was the offshoot of the provincial authorities’
November 1986 investment  incentive package that went beyond the national
provisions and was more generous than the packages offered by other provinces.  In
terms of the amount of realized DFI, the surge came after 1990.  Starting from just 4
percent of the realized amount of foreign investments in China in 1990, Jiangsu’s
share increased to 12 percent in 1996.
Shanghai was the location for pioneer joint ventures.  In 1987, Shanghai was
next to Guangdong as site for DFI.  Shanghai is the consular, business and
commercial center of China and thus, has a large international community.   The early
DFIs in the province were large service-sector projects such as hotels and apartment
complexes.  Being a leading industrial city, Shanghai got the first large high-profile
industrial DFIs such as the Schindler, Bell, Pilkington and Volkswagen projects.
Shanghai was also able to attract a good portion of the export-oriented, relatively
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Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, p. 83.
5 Pomfret, 1991, Table 5.6, p. 92.
smaller-scale joint venture projects with Hong Kong entrepreneurs. This enabled the
province to retain its importance as DFI hosts until the 1990s.   In 1996, Shanghai still
accounted for a substantial one-tenth of total DFI in China despite the sprouting of
other coastal locations.  This could be attributed to a number of factors.   One is the
existence of port facilities in the city.  Another is the creation of three Export
Development Zones (EDZ) and the introduction of new foreign investment incentives
better than those provided by national legislation in 1986.  This second factor paved
the way for the entry of the SEZ-type, small to medium-scale joint ventures into
Shanghai from the late 1980s.  A third reason is the wage factor.  In 1985, Shanghai’s
wage index of 153.7 was just half of Shenzhen’s.6  Further, Shanghai has a long
tradition of entrepreneurship with close connections with overseas Chinese in Hong
Kong as several of the city’s businessmen fled to Hong Kong when the Communists
took over the Chinese government.
Beijing, the capital city of China and an industrial, commercial and
international city like Shanghai, is another site for the pioneer and larger joint
ventures.     The distinctive feature of DFI in this city is the high concentration of
service industries, the mo t prominent of which are the large hotel projects such as the
Great Wall Hotel.7    It failed to attract the non-service, export-oriented joint ventures
and hence by 1996, its share to total DFI had been reduced to 4 percent.  Partly to
blame for this was the heavy bureaucracy in  the capital city.
1.4 Source Countries
The biggest source of foreign investments in China is Hong Kong.    By the
end of 1983, 128 out of a total of 198 joint venture projects in China were undertaken
by Hong Kong investors.8  These were mostly small manufacturing entities
capitalized at less than U.S. $ 1 million.  Hence, in value terms, they amounted to
only U.S. $ 47 million or 23 percent of the total in China of U.S. $ 207 million.  From
1984 to the first half of the 1990s, Hong Kong accounted for more than half of the
amount of direct and other foreign investment flows to China.  The 1984-1985 foreign
investment boom in China was helped by the rapid growth of small joint v ntures
which were mostly located in Guangdong, the province adjacent to Hong Kong.
These were mostly Hong Kong firms transferring their export activities into China in
reaction to higher wages and land rents in Hong Kong and to the appreciation of the
U. S. dollar with which the Hong Kong dollar was pegged.  These investment flows
from Hong Kong continued and, together with capital from Taiwan and South Korea,
brought about the unprecedented investment boom in China in the early 1990s.
Hence, throughout the ten-year period 1987-1996, realized Hong Kong investments
increased more than ten times from U.S. $ 1.8 billion to U.S. $ 20.9 billion.9
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9 Note, however, that inward DFI from Hong Kong may be overestimated as capital of Chinese
origin is reportedly recycled and disguised as DFI to take advantage of special tax and incentives to
foreign investors.  A WB estimate put recycled capital of Chinese origin or disguised DFI to be around
25 percent of gross DFI in 1992 (WB Discussion Paper, 1993).
Table I.5 Direct and Other Foreign Investments in China by Region/Country of
Origin (Utilized Amount)
Region/Country 1987 1990 1993 1996
Value in US $ Millions
Hong Kong & Macao 1,809 2,118 18,032 20,852
Taiwan - - 3,139 3,482
Japan 267 520 1,361 3,692
Korea - - 381 1,504
United States 271 461 2,068 5,051
Europe 124 182 794 3,013
Southeast Asia 37 65 1,005 3,185
     Indonesia - 1 66 94
     Malaysia - 1 91 460
     Philippines 4 2 122 56
     Singapore 22 53 492 2,247
     Thailand 11 8 234 328
Others 139 409 991 1,356
Total 2,647 3,755 27,771 42,135
Shares in Percent
Hong Kong & Macao 68.3 56.4 64.9 49.5
Taiwan - - 11.3 8.3
Japan 10.1 13.8 4.9 8.8
Korea - - 1.4 3.6
United States 10.2 12.3 7.4 12.0
Europe 4.7 4.8 2.9 7.2
Southeast Asia
     Indonesia - 0.0 0.2 0.2
     Malaysia - 0.0 0.3 1.1
     Philippines 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
     Singapore 0.8 1.4 1.8 5.3
     Thailand 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.8
Others 5.3 10.9 3.6 3.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:   China Statistical Yearbook, 1988 and 1998
Statistics-Utilization of Foreign Capital
Hong Kong investments are typically small to medium-scale manufacturing
ventures engaged in labor-intensive export activities.    The Hong Kong partner brings
in the design and in most cases the materials.  They take charge of quality control and
export marketing.   This arrangement involves minor capital requirements but quick
returns.   The SEZs in Guangdong, particularly Shenzhen, are the favorite sites.  In
1993, Guangdong captured 40 percent of the DFI contract amount from Hong Kong.
Fujian got 11 percent followed by Shanghai’s 6 percent.   Hong Kong investors had
82 percent of their capital placed in the coastal regions in 1993, higher than the
national average of 81 percent.
Table I.6 Direct Foreign Investments in China by Country of Origin &
Province/City of Destination, 1993 (Contract Amount)
Province/City Hong Kong
& Macao
Taiwan Japan United States
Of America
Value in US $ Millions
Beijing 4,057 585 167 738
Coastal 59,939 7,239 2,229 4,383
   Tianjin 1,026 288 113 338
   Shanghai 4,481 530 370 599
   Liaoning 2,080 307 359 384
   Hebei 1,052 185 45 135
   Shandong 3,650 911 231 593
   Jiangsu 5,407 1,697 543 973
   Fujian 7,795 1,549 107 264
   Guangdong 29,252 1,136 379 631
   Hainan 2,379 382 43 310
   Guangxi 2,817 254 39 156
Interior Region9,109 1,708 395 974
Total 73,105 9,532 2,791 6,095
Shares in Percent
Beijing 5.5 6.1 6.0 12.1
Coastal 82.0 75.9 79.9 71.9
   Tianjin 1.4 3.0 4.0 5.5
   Shanghai 6.1 5.6 13.3 9.8
   Liaoning 2.8 3.2 12.9 6.3
   Hebei 1.4 1.9 1.6 2.2
   Shandong 5.0 9.6 8.3 9.7
   Jiangsu 7.4 17.8 19.5 16.0
   Fujian 10.7 16.3 3.8 4.3
   Guangdong 40.0 11.9 13.6 10.4
   Hainan 3.3 4.0 1.5 5.1
   Guangxi 3.9 2.7 1.4 2.6
Interior 12.5 17.9 14.2 16.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
Economic relations between China and Taiwan were not officially allowed
until the late 1980s.   Prior to the official permission, only informal and indirect
transactions were carried out via a third economy, usually Hong Kong.    Both China
and Taiwan changed its stance toward each other in the 1980s.   China shifted from
one of a hardline military liberation policy to a peaceful unification policy.  It was
thought that the prospect of economic gains and economic dependence would draw
Taiwanese to the idea of unification.  The business climate were made more favorable
to Taiwanese investors with special priv leges  granted to them.  In Taiwan,
democratization and the removal of martial law had led to the gradual easing of
restrictions on economic relations with China.   In 1987, Taiwanese were officially
allowed to visit China.   Importations from China have been admitted since 1989 and
export and investment flows to China have been officially recognized since 1990.
With the change in the political climate between China and Taiwan, economic
forces were able to determine the course of relations between the two.   Within the
economy of Taiwan, three major push factors for direct investments abroad appeared.
First was the  sharp appreciation  of the N.T. dollar v rsus the U.S. dollar in the
second half of the 1980s as a result of the huge trade surplus.  In 1986, Taiwan’s trade
surplus had climbed to almost 20 percent of GDP.  As a consequence, the N.T. dollar-
U.S. dollar exchange rate fell from 40 in 1985 to 26 in 1989.   Second was the rapidly
increasing wage rate.   This was both the direct effect of the 1983 Labor Law and the
offshoot of the expansion of the Taiwanese economy, specifically of the service
sector, in the second half of the 1980s.  Third was the increase in land prices in
Taiwan.  Not only did it force new investors to go abroad but the sale of land at high
prices enabled old firms and landlords to have the funds for foreign investments.10
China, on the other hand, had abundant supply of labor at low wages as well as low
land prices and rent to offer.   All these economic considerations, together with
locational advantages and historical and cultural ties, led to the surge of Taiwanese
investments into China.    In 1993, Taiwan was already the second largest source of
foreign investments in China, accounting for more than 11 percent of the total.
Most Taiwanese investors in China are into manufacturing.   Between 1990
and 1992, 73 percent of approved Taiwanese investments went to the manufacturing
sector while only 14 percent went to finance, insurance and real estate industries.
Within the manufacturing sector, the majority of Taiwanese investments are
concentrated in the traditional export industries of Taiwan such as electrical and
electronic machinery and appliances, food, metal products, plastic products, wearing
apparel and miscellaneous products.11  Proximity o Taiwan makes Fujian nd Jiangsu
the location of choice for Taiwanese investors.  The Fujian dialect is also very similar
to Taiwan’s and many Taiwanese are of Fujian origin.  Taiwanese investments,
however, are more geographically spread than Hong Kong’s which was heavily
concentrated in the province of Guangdo g.  In 1993, approved Taiwanese
investments in Jiangsu and Fujian were 18 and 16 percent, respectively.  Next in line
were Guangdong with 12 percent and Shandong, 10 percent.  Taiwanese investments
in the interior regions were also relatively more significant.  In 1993, the interiors
regions’ share in Taiwanese investments was 18 percent, higher than the ratios for the
other major inverstors, Hong Kong, Japan and the United States.
Japanese investors were seen as rather slow in taking part in the investment
boom in China.  The first joint ventures with Japan were established in 1980,
Hitachi’s color television factory in Fuj a and Otsuka’s medical products firm in
Tianjin.  During the first five years of the opening of China, only 13 of the 198 joint
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ventures  or a mere 7 percent were of Japanese origin.12  In value terms, cumulative
investments from Japan by the end of 1983 amounted to only U.S. $ 18 million or 5
percent of the total, thus, making the Japanese investment project smaller than the
average project size for all investors.   Japanese investments gradually increased from
the latter part of 1983 as both Chinese and Japanese governments undertook measures
to make the business climate in China more conducive to Japanese investors.
Examples of these measures include the 1983 tax treaty between Japan and China to
avoid double taxation and the enactment of laws on brands and patents.   Hence, for
the year 1987, actual Japanese investments amounted to U.S. $ 267 million which was
about 10 percent of the total.
The scenario in Japan in the 1980s  was similar to those of Taiwan and Hong
Kong – the strengthening of the yen, huge surpluses in the current account, and the
high costs of labor and land.  These factors, together with the growing protectionist
sentiments against Japan-produced goods in the West, drove the Japanese firms out of
Japan and into low-cost bases for export production in countries in Asia.13 Initially,
that was in the late 1980s, much of the Japanese capital was going to Southeast Asia,
particularly, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  It was only in the 1990s that Japanese
firms started to be strongly interested in investing in China.  In 1990, actual Japanese
investments in China amounted to just half a billion U.S. dollars.   In 1996, the
amount had reached U.S. $ 3.7 billion.  Unlike Taiwanese and Hong Kong
investments which were concentrated in China, the excess funds in Japan were
distributed among several Asian countries.14 A number of ea ons could be cited for
Japanese firms’ rather delayed and moderate entry into China.  The socio-political
uncertainties surrounding the business environment in China deterred many of the
prospective Japanese investors in the 1980s.  Despite the promulgation of the reform
and open-door policy and the Joint Venture Law, regulations concerning foreign
investors’ operations were vague.  There were numerous bureaucratic problems.
There was the question on political stability as manifested by the June 1989
Tiananmen Square incident.   Social infrastructure in electricity, transportation and
communication systems were deficient.  Further, Japanese investors wanted to first
see that sound macroeconomic management take root in China.  The development gap
between China and Japan is also much wider compared to the gap between China and
Taiwan or Hong Kong and hence, the v rtical production complementarity is much
less.
Japanese investments are dispersed among several coastal provinces.
Shanghai is the biggest recipient in terms of the number of contracts, followed by
Beijing.  These locations have the industrial and commercial base, the infrastructure
and a large international community necessary and important to non-ethnic Chinese
investors like the Japanese.  Liaoning, with its heavy industries base, captured about
13 percent of the approved amount of Japanese DFI in 1993.  Substantial Japanese
investments are also directed to  Jiangsu, G ang ong and Shandong.  Majority of
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fiscal year (FY) 1991, the share of China was 10 percent; Indonesia, 20; Malaysia, 15; Thailand, 14;
and Hong Kong, 16.  In FY 1993, China’s share rose to 24 percent but the shares of the other Asian
countries remained substantial: Hong Kong; 19; Malaysia, 12; Singapore, 10; Indonesia, 10; and
Thailand, 9. In the early 1990s, as the economy and the political situation in the Philippines stabilized,
the country was also able to attract some Japanese direct investments (about 3 percent).
Japanese firms are engaged in electric/electronic machinery and textile production.
These two sectors, together, made up about 60 percent of the aggregate number of
Japanese-invested firms as of 1994.15
The Americans and the Europeans were earlier than the Japanese to respond to
the call for investments by China.    These western investors were responsible for the
large joint venture projects that accounted for the lion’s share of the total amount of
foreign investments during the first five years of the Open-Door policy.  Hence,
although the U.S. investors (21 cases) and the European investors (16 cases)
represented only about one-fifth of the cumulative number of projects by the end of
1983, they contributed almost half of the investment amount.    Actual investments
from both the U.S. and Europe continued to expand in the 1980s and the 1990s.    In
1996, the U.S. was second only to Hong Kong , providi 12 percent of actual DFI.
Europe’s 7 percent share was not far below Taiwan’s 8 percent.  U.S. and European
investments, like Japan’s, are more into capital-intensive activities (e.g.:
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, automobiles, telecommunications and industrial and
commercial equipment and machinery)  and e ce require greater capitalization.16
They are less oriented toward the export market and therefore,  have less incentiv  to
locate in the SEZ areas.
Among the five Southeast Asian nations, the Philippines and Thailand were
the first to invest in China.  By the end of 1983, there were already five joint venture
projects with Philippine partners in China, infusing some U.S. $ 42 million.   Thailand
had one with a measly amount of U.S. $ 0.27 million.    Investments from Southeast
Asia, likewise, accelerated in the 1990s, with the bulk being contributed by
Singapore.   Singapore’s share in DFIs to China grew continuously from only 1
percent in 1987 to more than 5 percent in 1996.  Malaysia’s involvement turned more
active relative to the three other Southeast Asian countries towards the middle part of
the present decade.
1.5 Type of Arrangement
Direct foreign investments in China can be classified into three major types:
equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises.  An equity joint venture is a limited company jointly funded through
equity by Chinese and foreign  investors.   The investing parties share profits or losses
in proportion to their respective equity shares.  The contractual jo nt venture, also
referred to as “cooperative venture”, allows for the Chinese partners to contribute
resources such as land, labor, local equipment and facilities instead of financial
equity.   The foreign partners, in addition to funds, may contribute technology, major
new equipment and materials.  The contributions as well as the operation and
management responsibilities of the Chinese and foreign partners are stated in the
contract.   In a contractual joint venture, profits and losses are divided according to a
ratio also stated in the contract.   A wholly foreign-owned enterprise is a company
with no Chinese equity participation.  It can either be a branch f a foreign company
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or an entirely new and independent enterprise formed by a foreign company or a
group of individuals who are non-Chinese citizens.  The foreign owners are fully
responsible for profits and losses. 17
The type of arrangement by which direct foreign investments entered China
had significantly changed over the years.   Until 1983, contractual joint ventures had
dominated, accounting for about 82 percent of investments in terms of the number of
contracts and 88 percent in terms of the contract amount.   The foreign partners in
these  contractual joint ventures were mostly of Hong Kong origin who wanted to take
advantage of low wages and low land prices in China.  These Hong Kong investors
were more familiar with the culture and practices of their fellow Chinese in the
mainland and were more open to enter into detailed negotiations with them.  On the
part of the Chinese partners, a contractual joint venture arrangement appeared to be a
better and more feasible option initially since it would not require from them cash
outlay.      Equity joint ventures accounted for about 14 percent of the number of
contacts and 6 percent of the amount during 1979-1983 while the corresponding
shares of wholly foreign-owned enterprises were 4 and 7 percent.
Equity joint ventures became increasingly important from 1985 and was the
assumed  form for the majority of direct foreign investments in China in the 1990s.
The number and value of wholly-foreign owned investments likewise rose from 1987
and by 1996, about a third of direct foreign investments in terms of both number and
value were of this type.     The share of contractual joint ventures, on the other hand,
shrank to 12 percent of the number and 20 percent of the value of foreign investments.
Two reasons are cited for the increased use of the 100 percent foreign-equity type of
investments.18  First is the inclination of Taiwanese investors, an important source of
foreign capital in the 1990s,  to control their own companies rather than cooperate
with partners.  Second, wholly foreign-owned arrangements involve less costs and
time as long and tedious negotiations about financial capital, technology and
management contributions of the partners in contractual and equity joint ventures are
avoided.
2. Outward Direct Foreign Investments
China’s outward direct investments were much less significant than the
inflows, the ratio of outward to inward DFI being only 0.7 percent in terms of number
of contracts and 0.5 percent in terms of amount of investments.   For every 1,000
investors in China, there is only one Chinese investor abroad and for every US $
1,000 foreign investments in China, there is only US $ 1 of Chinese investment in
other countries.  Nevertheless, Chinese capital has flowed into other countries since it
started its ‘Open Door’ policy.
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Table I.7 Direct Foreign Investments in China by Arrangement Type
Type 1983(a) 1990 1993 1996
US $
Mil.
%
Share
US $
Mil.
%
Share
US $
Mil.
%
Share
US $
Mil.
%
Share
Number of Contracts
Joint Ventures188 14.2 4,056 56.1 53,488 64.6 12,628 51.4
Contractual(b)
Joint Ventures
1,085 81.8 1,316 18.2 10,789 13.0 2,866 11.7
Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises
53 4.0 1,856 25.7 18,525 22.4 9,062 36.9
Total 1,326 100.0 7,228 100.0 82,802100.0 24,556 100.0
Contract Amount
Joint Ventures340 5.5 2,628 41.5 54,423 50.0 31,876 43.5
Contractual
Joint Ventures
5,370 87.6 1,258 19.9 25,384 23.3 14,590 19.9
Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises
420 6.9 2,442 38.6 29,134 26.7 26,810 36.6
Total 6,130 100.0 6,328 100.0108,941100.0 73,276 100.0
Utilized Amount
Joint Ventures 1,876 57.9 14,966 57.4 20,754 49.7
Contractual
Joint Ventures
663 20.5 4,905 18.8 8,365 20.0
Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises
703 21.7 6,219 23.8 12,606 30.2
Total 3,242 100.0 26,090100.0 41,725 100.0
Source:   Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues
Notes on the Table
(a) Cumulative
(b) Contractual Joint Ventures include Cooperative Development (cooperation with foreign countries
in offshore oil development) and Cooperative Operations (joint production with foreign countries).
From 1979 to 1985, investing overseas could be undertaken only by state-
owned import and export corporations under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), and provincial and municipal
international economic and technological cooperation enterprises regulated by the
Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.  Within this seven-year
period, Chinese capital went into 185 non-trading enterprises  overseas.  Chinese
investments summed to US $ 154 million which was roughly 62 percent of total
investment amount in the contracts.  Most of these investments were in the form of
joint venture and were located in developing countries.  Few of the Chinese overseas
enterprises were concerned with manufacturing activities.  They were mainly in
catering, engineering, finance and insurance, and consultancy.19
In 1985, a directive that expanded the scope of enterprises eligible for
overseas investments was issued by MOFERT.  With the new directive, all
enterprises, both public and private, can apply for permission to establish subsidiaries
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in other countries if they possess sufficient capital and technical and operation know-
how, and if a suitable foreign partner can be found.
The 1985 directive resulted in enhanced Chinese investments overseas so that
by the end of 1990, there were a total of 801 Chinese-invested enterprises in the
world, involving about US $ 1.2 billion of Chinese capital.  This meant an add tional
616 enterprises in 1986-1990, more than 3 times the number in 1979-1985.   In terms
of dollar value, the additional amount of Chinese investments of US $ 1.1 billion was
almost 7 times of the 1979-1985 value.  Chinese capital accounted for about 50
percent of the total amount of investments.  It was during the period 1986-1990 that
Chinese investors started to engage in manufacturing activities.  The industries into
which Chinese capital flowed became diversified, including metallurgy and minerals,
petro-chemicals and chemicals, electronic and light industry, transportation, finance,
insurance, medicine, and tourism.  It was also during this period that the rise of big
Chinese transnational corporations such as China National Metals and Minerals
Import and Export Corporation and China National Chemical Import and Export
Corporation was witnessed.20
In the 1990s, the Chinese government encouraged instead of just allowing
outward direct foreign investments.  Top ranking national and local officials publicly
expressed the need for Chinese businesses to explore international markets and
expand operations overseas to further strengthen themselves and to avoid
discriminatory measures imposed by the host government, as well.  The Chinese
government sponsored and organized seminars and workshops on business
opportunities abroad,  on how to establish overseas subsidiaries, and on ways and
means of improving overseas business operations. As a result, Chinese companies
continued to expand outwardly with additional 1,184 overseas subsidiaries established
between 1991 and 1996.  Chinese capital infused in these overseas business
undertakings was US $ 943 million, representing 44 percent of the total investments.
Table I.8 Approved Overseas Investments of China
1979-1985 1986-1990 1991-1996 Total
Number of Enterprises 185 616 1,184 1,985
Total Investments (US $ M)249 2,146 2,122 4,517
Chinese Investments
     Value (US $ M)
     % of Total Investments
154
61.8
1,055
49.2
943
44.4
2,152
47.6
Source:  Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues
The biggest recipient of Chinese overseas investments in terms of number of
enterprises is the United States.  Up to 1996, the United States had attracted 238
Chinese investors, representing 12 percent of the total number.   The large share of the
European bloc was due mainly to Russia, which until 1996 had hosted 227 Chinese-
invested enterprises, just a few firms less than that of the United States.  Hong Kong
and Macao combined ranked third with a total of 191 Chinese-invested entities by
1996.  Of the five Southeast Asian countries, Thailand had attracted the most number,
134, of Chinese investments, accounting for a substantial 42 percent of the total for
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the region.  The Philippines compared very poorly with Thailand, with the least
number in the region, only 29, of Chinese-invested ventures.  In terms of the value of
Chinese investments, Canada, though hosting only 77 Chinese enterprises, ranked
first with US $ 371 million of Chinese capital or 17 percent of the total.    A close
second and third were the United States and Australia accounting for 16 and 15
percent, respectively, of the total value of Chinese overseas investments.    It can be
inferred from the data that Chinese enterprises in Canada and Australia were much
bigger than those of the other countries.  Russia, on the other hand, had the smaller
Chinese-invested projects as its value share of 4 percent was way below its share of
11 percent in terms of number of enterprises.   The Chinese investors in Southeast
Asia likewise appeared to be relatively smaller.   The most important Southeast Asian
recipient, Thailand, accounted for 3 percent (half of the region’s share) of the total
value of Chinese investments while the Philippine share was a measly half of a
percent point.
Table I.9  Approved Overseas Investments of China by Country/Region of
Destination 1979-1996
Number of
Enterprises
Chinese
Investments
Country/Region
Number % Share Value
U$ $ M
% Share
Ratio (%)
Chinese Capital
to Total
Hong Kong &
Macao
191 9.6 257 11.9 58.4
United States 82 4.1 15 0.7 34.9
Europe 238 12.0 352 16.4 74.3
Southeast Asia395 19.9 157 7.3 46.7
   Indonesia 321 16.2 134 6.2 34.3
   Malaysia 33 1.7 18 0.8 37.5
   Philippines64 3.2 25 1.2 43.1
   Singapore 29 1.5 10 0.5 35.7
   Thailand 61 3.1 15 0.7 28.3
Australia 134 6.8 66 3.1 32.4
Canada 91 4.6 325 15.1 26.4
Others 77 3.9 371 17.2 53.0
Total 590 29.7 541 25.1 60.0
Source:  Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1997/1998
The last column of Table I.9 gives the proportion of Chinese capital in total
investment by country of destination.  First in this criterion was the United States
where the Chinese investors contributed almost three-fourths of total capital on the
average.  Chinese participation in European and Canadian ventures was
approximately 50 percent. Chinese investors, on the other hand, were the minority in
joint ventures in all of the 5 Southeast Asian countries, infusing only about a third of
the total capital.  Remarkably, the Chinese stake in the big venture projects in
Australia was just 26 percent, the lowest in the least.
II
Factors Affecting Direct Foreign Investment Flows
1. Determinants of and Motivations for DFI
There exist a number of excellent theoretical and empirical analyses on the
factors that affect the size, distribution and structure of DFI flows between countries.
The different factors discussed in these studies can be grouped into the determining
factors (host-country perspective) and the motivating factors (home-country
perspective).  The home-country variables, the economic conditions and policy factors
in the source countries, determine the potential supply of DFI.  The characteristics of
and the business environment in alternative host countries, on the other hand,
determine the direction of the available supply of direct foreign capital.
1.1 Host-Country Variables
Host-country variables include macroeconomic and microeconomic factors
relevant to investment decisions, policy formulations that directly or indirectly alter
the incentive-disincentive scheme for DFI, investment support factors, and risk
factors.
1.1.1 Macroeconomic Factors
The Accelerator Principle of Investments derives that the increase in capital
stock is directly proportional to expected output.  Expected output is approximated by
the size of the market.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in turn, can be used as an
indicator of the size of the market.  In accordance with this basic investment
formulation, most studies on DFI postulate a positive relationship between DFI and
output growth in the host-country.  A qualification, however, must be made.  The size
of the market and its potential growth are likely to influence only those DFIs that are
geared towards production of goods and services for the domestic market.  Access to
a large domestic market is important only to import-substituting DFI.
For DFIs that aim to produce for the world market, the relevant
macroeconomic variable is the exchange rate.    The real exchange rate, defined as the
price in real terms of the foreign currency the host-country uses for its  in ernational
transactions, affects the international competitiveness of producers in the host
countries.  An increase in the real exchange rate implies a real depreciation of the
host-country’s currency while a decline implies a real appreciation.  The concepts of
overvalued and undervalued currencies refer to situations in which the real exchange
rate is considered to be “too high” and “too low”, respectively, in relation to the
“correct” or “equilibrium” level.   An overvaluation/undervaluation of the host-
country’s currency makes goods and services produced in the host country more/less
expensive than goods and services produced elsewhere.   If the exchange rate does not
equalize production costs among different countries, there is a potential disincentive/
incentive for DFI to flow into the country with an overvalued/ undervalued currency.
1.1.2 Microeconomic Factors
The decision to invest is a microeconomic concern.  The single most important
consideration in any firm’s decision to invest is the prospect for higher profits.  Profit
maximization, given a target output level, is tantamount to cost minimization.
Assuming that a market, whether domestic or external, is guaranteed, profitability will
just depend on the cost functions.  Most DFIs, either domestic market-oriented or
export-oriented, are driven away from their home countries by rising production costs,
important components of which are labor and raw material costs.  Differences in
wages and raw material prices reflecting relative factor endowments among
prospective hosts influence the direction of DFI.
1.1.3 Policy Factors
These refer to all government actions that directly or indirectly alter the
incentive structure for DFI.  Fiscal incentives such as preferential tax rates and
investment allowances and subsidies are offered to encourage DFIs.  Lower tax rates
or outright tax exemptions improve after tax profits.  Investment allowances and
subsidies, on the other hand, lowers the effective cost of capital build-up to the firm.
Other government actions or policies, though unintended, can influence the
size, direction and structure of DFI flows.   The host country’s trade policy can
provide profit opportunities for foreign investors.   The type of trade policy that a
country pursues indicates the type of DFI that the country attracts.  A protectionist
trade policy, for instance, shelters domestic production from international competition
and hence, encourages the establishment of import-substituting DFIs.  Accordingly,
domestic market-oriented DFIs may be concentrated in highly protected sectors.
Policies that facilitate export activities, on the other hand, will attract more export-
oriented DFIs.
The exchange rate policy of the host country is also an important consideration
for DFIs.  As discussed earlier, a policy that supports an undervalued exchange rate
can lead to more DFI inflows.  Liberalization of the foreign exchange market may be
necessary to attract DFIs as they engage more extensively in international transactions
such as importations and profit and income remittances.
1.1.4 Investment Support Factors
Investment support factors pertain to the availability of infrastructure as well
as suppliers and service industries.  Sufficient networks of roads, ports, airports,
telecommunication facilities, and energy and material suppliers are required for DFIs’
operations in the host country to be  pr fi able. A country with poor infrastructure
may have difficulties in capturing a significant amount of DFI.
1.1.5Risk Factors
Foreign investors measure risks in terms of the political conditions in the host
country.  Political instability is associated with production disruption, confiscation or
damage to property, threats to personnel, and changes in macroeconomic management
or the regulatory environment.
1.2 Home-Country Variables
1.2.1 Macroeconomic Factors
The macroeconomic variables that affect outward investments include income,
the exchange rate and the balance in the current account.   High income growth rates
result in high savings rate which implies more investment funds.
A surplus in the current account is another  form of savings which is generated
by the economy from external trade transactions.  Trade surpluses do not only
generate funds for investment spending, they also make available foreign exchange
for outward investments.
1.2.2Microeconomic Factors
Excess funds or external surpluses alone do not result in outward investments.
Firms undertaking investments abroad must be internationally competitive. Outward
investments require some special firm-specific competitive advantage to overcome the
intrinsic cost disadvantages of overseas operations.  This competitive advantage may be
in production technology, management, marketing, access to world markets, etc.
1.2.3Policy Factors
Outward investments may also be policy-induced.  Deregulation of the foreign
exchange and financial markets in the home country facilitates the movement of
capital and can encourage outward investments.  Fiscal policies such as heavy
taxation of profits and business activities as well as export taxes may also encourage
firms to locate elsewhere to escape the burden of taxation in the home country.
Recently, environmental regulations in the developed nations have also been very
prohibitive.  Abatement costs for compliance with environmental standards may
augment costs to such extent that production in the home country becomes less
competitive.
1.2.4Demonstration Effects
Demonstration effects such as the bandwagon effect operate among the
smaller foreign investors which are often more risk-averse and whose information
about the prospective host country is limited.  The relative attractiveness of
prospective host countries as sites for DFI is indicated by the actual choices made by
earlier and bigger investors.   Expectations also tend to be self-fulfilling as the
massive inflows of DFI result in increased economic activities.
1.2.5Other Factors
Specific factors such as historical circumstances, cultural familiarity and
geographical proximity may be important considerations for the smaller foreign
investors.  For these small country investors, transactional and information-cost
factors are significant determinants of the direction of DFI.
2. China's Inward Investments
2.1 China’s Share in the Global Supply of DFI
How has the emergence of China as a host for direct foreign investments
affected foreign capital inflows in the ASEAN countries, specifically, the Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia?  Have the massive flows of inward investments in
China drained the supply of foreign capital in the four ASEAN countries?
Though China began to open its doors to foreign investors in 1979, it was not
until the 1990s that big waves of foreign capital arrived at its shores.  From 1991 to
1996, in a span of merely five years, inward direct investments in the country grew
ten-fold.  Remarkably, DFI flows into China posted strong growth rates despite
volatility in the global supply of investments during the same period.  The contraction
in the world stock of DFI in 1991, 1992 and 1996 appeared to have adversely affected
to a greater extent the industrial countries.  Like China, the developing countries as a
whole enjoyed consistently i creasing  inward DFI although the average annual
growth rate for the entire group of 26 percent was much lower than China's 61
percent.  A different picture emerges when one looks at the four ASEAN countries
individually.  With the exception of Indonesia, all experienced a volatile pattern of
investment inflows as in the global case, recording negative growth rates in three of
the six years.  Table II.1 therefore reveals contrasting scenarios on DFI developments
for China and the three ASEAN countries, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.
The investment boom in China during the period was clearly not paralleled by similar
developments in the three ASEAN countries.
The very favorable trend of inward investments in China was likewise
reflected in terms of shares to global DFI.  In 1990, only 1.5 percent of the global
supply of foreign capital went to China.  By 1996, China's share had significantly
increased to 12 percent.  This could have explained to a large extent the increase in
the share of developing countries in global DFI from 14 percent to 39 percent during
the period.   The shares of Indonesia and Malaysia likewise posted improvements
from 1990 to 1996 while that of the Philippines was barely maintained and Thailand's
was reduced slightly.   It can therefore be said that the much improved share of China
did not eat on the shares of its four ASEAN neighbors, nor on the share of the
developing countries as a group.  If crowding-out had indeed taken place, it had been
at the expense of the industrial countries whose share dipped by about  10 percentage
points from 1990 to 1996.   The greater magnitude of the increase in China's share
relative to the magnitude of the drop in the industrial countries' share and the positive
growth in the global supply of DFI may be indicative of new stocks of DFI generated
by China's “Open-Door” policy.   Indeed in the early 1990s, export surpluses in the
newly industrialized countries of Asia, particularly Taiwan and Hong Kong, were
recycled into additional supplies of global DFI specifically directed to China.
The trade-intensity framework can also be employed in the analysis of DFI
flows.21  Interests and preference of investing countries in particular host countries
may be indicated by the investment-intensity index.  The index is defined as the ratio
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of the share of the jth source country in total inward DFI of the ithrecipient c un ry to
the share of the jth source country in the global supply of investments.  Since the
objective is to compare source countries' investments in China and the four ASEAN
countries, the total supply of DFI in China and the four ASEAN countries, instead of
the global supply of DFI, is used for the denominator of the formula.
Table II.2 Intensity Index of Investment in China and the ASEAN-4
Source Country/Region 1986 1990 1994 1995 1996
In China By
United States 122 184 87 84 95
Japan 51 55 62 52 42
Asian NIES 165 144 127 186 146
European Union 73 42 - 48 58
ASEAN-4 62 10 98 85 50
In the ASEAN-4 By
United States 81 88 112 110 104
Japan 143 107 136 129 148
Asian NIES 43 94 75 48 62
European Union 124 108 - 132 134
ASEAN-4 133 113 101 109 141
Source:  JETRO
Table II.2 presents estimates of intensity indices of investments from two
source countries, namely United States and Japan, and three source regions--the Asian
Newly Industrialized Countries (NIEs consisting of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore), the European Union (EU), and the ASEAN-4 into China and the
ASEAN-4.  The intensity index of investments in China from the Asian NIE was
greater than 100 for all the years sampled indicating stronger interests and attention
accorded to China relative to the ASEAN-4 by this economic bloc in general.  The
intensity index of Unites States investments in China, on the other hand, exceeded
100 in 1986 and 1990 but fell below 100 in 1994-1996, implying diminished
American interests in China in the mid-1990s.   The calculated intensity indices of
investments from Japan, the EU and ASEAN-4 reveal stronger interests of these
countries/regions in the ASEAN-4 bloc relative to China.
Table II.1 Inward Direct Foreign Investments
Country/Region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Growth Rates (%)
China 25.2155.5146.622.8 6.1 12.1 61.4
Philippines 2.6-58.1443.028.5 -7.1-35.0 62.3
Thailand -1.8 4.9 -14.6-24.351.4 13.0 4.8
Malaysia 71.429.6 -3.4-13.3-4.822.9 17.1
Indonesia 35.619.9 12.8 5.2106.242.5 37.0
Developing
Countries
23.619.0 47.2 23.8 6.5 33.6 25.6
Industrial
Countries
-32.44.3 15.9 2.6 44.6 1.1 6.0
World -17.4-0.517.7 16.0 27.5 -0.7 7.1
Shares to Global DFI (%)
China 1.5 2.3 5.8 12.2 12.9 10.7 12.1 8.2
Philippines 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3
Thailand 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Malaysia 1.0 2.1 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.8
Indonesia 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.0
Developing
Countries
14.4 21.625.8 32.3 34.5 28.8 38.8 28.0
Industrial
Countries
72.6 59.562.3 61.4 54.3 61.6 62.7 62.1
World 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0 100.0
 Source:  World Investment Report, various issues
In Table II.3, the intensity indices of investments from each of the Asian NIEs
are shown.  The ASEAN-4 bloc is likewise segregated both as source countries and
recipient countries.  This is done to determine individual countries' interests in China
as well as in e ch  country of the ASEAN-4.    In the mid-1990s, investors from the
United States and Japan manifested greater preference for Thailand and Malaysia.
The high intensity index of investments from the Asian NIEs in China in the mid
1990s was largely due to Hong Kong.  Singapore appeared to be more interested in
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  Remarkably, the intensity index of investments
from the Philippines was high for China but very low for its fellow ASEAN countries.
Indonesia displayed equally strong interests in China and the ASEAN-4 economies.
Among the ASEAN nations, Malaysia appeared to be the least motivated to invest in
China in 1994 and 1996.
Table II.3 Intensity Index of Investment in China and ASEAN-4 Countries
Source China Philippines Thailand Malaysia Indonesia ASEAN-4
1994
United States87 340 263 131 49 112
Japan 62 44 437 156 66 136
Asian NIES127 46 37 79 87 75
  Korea 54 16 13 91 197 143
  Taiwan 91 104 73 230 95 108
  Hong Kong154 32 9 20 67 50
  Singapore63 46 174 169 127 134
European
Union
- - - - - -
ASEAN-4 98 445 61 5 95 101
  Philippines159 - 42 4 58 45
  Thailand159 546 - 23 11 45
  Malaysia 49 564 96 - 146 148
  Indonesia207 5 0 0 - 0
1996
United States95 39 243 195 25 104
Japan 42 28 225 129 122 148
Asian NIES146 74 94 80 44 62
  Korea 81 28 166 94 102 116
  Taiwan 109 9 274 59 23 93
  Hong Kong206 121 5 0 15 13
  Singapore54 30 143 282 106 138
European
Union
58 156 145 45 149 134
ASEAN-4 50 157 19 7 224 141
  Philippines204 - - 45 15 15
  Thailand 37 30 - 1 257 152
  Malaysia 53 30 28 - 222 139
  Indonesia102 263 121 127 - 98
Source:  JETRO
2.2 The Investment Climate
2.2.1Income Growth
The Chinese economy has continuously expanded since its adoption of
market-oriented policies and its "Open-Door" policy. With the explosive growth of its
domestic economy in the 1990s, China has emerged to be the world's fastest growing
market which multinationals can not afford to ignore.
Table II.4 shows real GDP growth rate for China, the ASEAN-4 countries and
the world.  Throughout the period 1981-1996, only China posted double-digit growth
rates that averaged 11 percent per year, more than thrice the worldwide average.
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia likewise performed quite impressively better than
the global average but still a little way below China's record.   The Philippines, on the
other hand, was at the tail end, with a growth performance below the world average.
Table II.4 Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
Year China Philippines Thailand Malaysia Indonesia World
1981-1990 (Ave)10.3 1.0 7.9 5.2 5.8 3.1
1991   9.2 -0.6 8.5 8.7 8.9 1.8
1992 14.2 0.3 8.1 8.0 7.2 2.8
1993 13.5 2.1 8.3 9.0 7.3 2.7
1994 12.6 4.4 8.9 9.1 7.5 4.1
1995 10.5 4.8 8.7 1.1 8.2 3.7
1996   9.6 5.5 6.7 8.8 7.8 4.1
1991-1996 (Ave)11.6 2.8 8.2 7.5 7.8 3.2
Source:  ADB Asian Development Outlook 1997 and 1998
2.2.2Labor Costs
An important factor that explains the influx of export-oriented DFI in China,
particularly from overseas Chinese, in the 1980s is its abundant supply of low-cost
labor.  Wages per employee for the manufacturing sector in China were only a fraction
one-fourth of ASEAN wages from 1980 to 1986.  Wages in the Philippines were lower
than the ASEAN average  but still significantly higher--about thrice the Chinese wages.
Indonesian wages were about double Chinese wages.  Remarkably, Malaysian and Thai
wages exceeded the over-all average for the ASEAN during the period.
To factor in differences in labor productivity among the countries, one can
look at labor cost per unit of good produced (wages divided by value-added).  Though
the gap between China and the ASEAN countries narrowed in terms of unit labor
cost, China's average of 0.15 for 1980-1986 was still much lower--only about half of
the ASEAN unit labor cost average.
2.2.3 Policy Factors
Investment Incentives. Foreign investments are allowed into China to acquire
the financial capital, foreign exchange and technology necessary for the country’s
pursuit of economic development.  Hence, policies are particularly undertaken to lure
foreign investors.  The approach adopted involves: (1) he provision of incentives,
largely administrative and fiscal to foreign investors and (2) the gradual liberalization
of the trade and exchange regimes.
Considering the gigantic size and specific conditions of the Chinese economy,
the introduction of incentives has been phased by region, starting with the coastal
provinces and then pushing forward into the inland regions.   This is done through the
setting up of special zones within which a g nerous package of incentives are offered
to make the economic and political environment conducive to foreign investments.
The first step was the establishment in 1980 of the four Special Economic Zones,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai nd  Shantou in Gua dong, and Xiamen in Fujian.22  This was
followed by the designation of 14 cities as open coastal cities and the establishment of
11 Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) in 1984 and 1985.
The Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and Xia-Zhang-Quan triangle region in
south Fujian were designated as Coastal Economic Open Areas also in 1985.  In 1988,
another SEZ was established in Hainan.  Thereafter, a number of iver-sid  and inland
capital cities and border economic cooperative areas have been opened.
Table II.5 Average Wages and Unit Labor Costs in the Manufacturing Sector
China Philippines Thailand Malaysia Indonesia ASEAN
Average Wages (US $)
1980 548 1,127 - 2,078 743 1,487
1981 479 1,241 - 2,200 897 1,680
1982 434 1,301 2,230 2,501 1,066 1,947
1983 462 1,349 - 2,794 905 1,959
1984 438 1,180 2,362 3,020 879 2,121
1985 384 1,258 - 3,084 921 1,861
1986 377 1,285 1,729 2,957 877 1,774
Average 446 1,249 2,107 2,662 898 1,833
Unit Labor Cost (US $)
1980 0.15 0.22 - 0.28 0.21 0.25
1981 0.15 0.25 - 0.31 0.21 0.27
1982 0.15 0.33 0.20 0.32 0.25 0.27
1983 0.16 0.21 - 0.30 0.27 0.29
1984 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.25
1985 0.15 0.23 - 0.30 0.24 0.29
1986 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.25
Average 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.27
Source:  NAPES Database
Special administrative measures to facilitat  the entry of foreign capital are
implemented in these special zones.  Government officials of the zones are given
larger and flexible economic management power, project approval power and some
legislative power.  Special foreign investment centers exist to extend assistance to
foreign investors.
A generous package of fiscal incentives are offered in the special zones.   In
the taxation of profits, foreign enterprises enjoy a number of concessions.   First, tax
rates for foreign firms’ profits are lower.  Second, they  are ex mpted from income
tax payment for two years in the case of productive enterprises and one year for
                                      
22 Southern China was chosen as the starting point because of its long history of external contact
and the existence of a transportation network that extends to both the international markets and the
inland regions.
service enterprises.23   After the exemption period, productive enterprises are entitled
to a 50 percent reduction of the tax rate for three years while the service enterprises
get the 50 percent reduction for two years.   For technology-advanced enterprises, the
rate reduction period may be extended for another three years.  In the case of
enterprises exporting at least 70 percent of their production, the tax rate imposed after
the period of exemption and reduction is only 10 percent.    Further, profit remittances
are not taxed.
Foreign firms are likewise exempt from many trade and indirect taxes.  Imports
of machine and quipment, spare parts and raw materials by foreign enterprises are
exempted from custom duties and the consolidated industrial and commercial tax24.
Foreign firms also do not pay export duties and indirect taxes for their exports.
Domestically-sourced materials25 used by foreign firms for their export products are
also not levied value-added taxes.   Special economic zones are treated as separate
custom areas and foreign enterprises in the zones are exempt from import licensing.
Though the tax reforms initiated in 1994 have aimed at equalizing the tax
burden and creating a level playing field for all domestic enterprises and eventually,
foreign enterprises, the tax concessions given to foreign firms have remained
attractive.  The new enterprise income tax of the 1994 reform, for instance, did not
affect the foreign-funded enterprises.   And although the tax reforms of 1994 had
subjected the foreign-funded enterprises to new indirect taxes, before they could ever
be fully implemented in 1998, new regulations on exemptions were announced.
Moreover, by the beginning of 1998, China started considering extending very
favorable terms to direct foreign investors in the central and western parts.   The
inland regions appear to be ready to offer foreign investors preferential measures that
are equivalent or better than those in the coastal zones.
Table II.6  is a checklist of incentives offered to foreign investors in China and
the ASEAN-4 countries.   The incentive package of the Chinese government appears
to be comparable and in some respect better than those of he ASEAN-4.
Specifically, China scores better in regard to basic rights and guarantees to investors,
tax and tariff concessions and assistance extended to foreign investors.
Trade and Foreign Exchange Policies. Trade nd  foreign exchange policies
in China have been shaped to a great extent by the need to address DFI concerns and
problems.  From a fully centrally planned trade structure in 1949-1978, the foreign
trade regime in China evolved towards decentralization and greater openness with the
1979 Equity Joint Venture Law allowing joint ventures to export and import directly
on their own account.  To make the business environment more attractive to foreign
investors, a system of duty exemptions and concessions for DFI exports and imports
have been provided as discussed earlier.
                                      
23 Productive enterprises must have invested at least US $ 10 million and registered an operation
period of more than ten years to be eligible for the income tax exemption and rate reduction.  For
service enterprises, amount of investments and operation period must be at least US $ 5 million and ten
years, respectively.
24 The consolidated industrial and commercial tax has been classified under the new VAT in the
Tax Reform of 1994.
25 Exceptions are crude oil, petroleum and a few state-designated items.
Table II.6 Comparative Investment Incentives
ChinaPhilippinesThailandMalaysiaIndonesia
Basic rights and guarantees
to investors
Guarantee against expropriation3 3 3 3 3
Guarantee against losses due to:
1) nationalization
2) damage caused by war
3) inconvertibility of currency
3
3
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
3
3
-
3
3
3
Remittance of foreign exchange
      earnings and payments3 3 3 3 3
Repatriation of capital3 3 3 3 3
Protection schemes and priorities
given to investors and aliens
Employment of aliens3 3 3 3 3
Patent protection 3 3 3 3 3
Preference in the granting of
     government loans- - 3 3 -
Protection against unjust
1) import competition
2) government competition local
competition
-
-
-
-
-
3
3
3
3
3
-
3
3
-
3
Real-estate ownership by alien
     investors 3 - 3 3 -
Exemptions from taxes and
Tariff duties
Capital gains tax 3 - 3 3 3
Corporate income tax3 3 3 3 -
Taxes on imported capital goods3 3 3 3 3
Taxes on imported raw materials3 3 3 3 3
Taxes on royalties 3 - 3 3 -
Withholding tax on interest on
     foreign loans (tax credit)3 - - 3 3
Other taxes and fees3 3 3 - 3
Deductions from taxable
Corporate income
Accelerated depreciation
allowance
3 - - 3 -
Carry forward of capital allowance
during the relief period- - - 3 -
Carry forward of loss3 - 3 3 3
Export allowances/deductions- - 3 3 -
Deduction of
1) organization expenses
2) pre-operating expenses
3
3
-
-
3
3
3
-
3
3
Reinvested profits - - - - -
Investment allowance - 3 - 3 -
Tax credits (direct reduction
from Corporate income taxes)
Investment tax credits- - - 3 -
Tax credit on domestic capital
    Equipment - 3 - - -
Other tax credits 3 3 - 3 3
Extension of incentive availment
period 3 3 - 3 -
Special incentives
To multinational companies- 3 - - -
To exporters 3 3 3 3 3
To offshore banking units- 3 - 3 -
Other laws granting benefits to
    foreign investors3 3 3 - -
Assistance to investors
Joint venture brokerage3 3 3 3 3
Technical assistance3 - 3 3 -
Processing of application and
    other requirements3 3 3 3 3
Source:   SGV, Comparative Investment Incentives (1987)
The reform of China’s policy of currency inconvertibility was rather delayed
and came only after foreign investors expressed frustration and disappointment as
they encountered difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange for their mportations, and
salary and profit repatriation.   Realizing the adverse impact of this foreign exchange
regime on the entry of foreign capital, the Chinese authorities established in 1986 a
dual exchange system, with an official rate that was adjusted periodically and a
market-determined rate set in the Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centers, also referred
to as the swap centers.   Under the dual exchange system which was in effect until the
end of 1993, foreign enterprises were allowed to retain all their foreign exchange
earnings and to engage in the purchase and sale of foreign exchange in the swap
markets.   Domestic enterprises and Foreign Trade Corporations were required to
surrender their export receipts at the official exchange rate but received retention
quotas in proportion to their exports.   The retention quotas, which entitled the owner
to purchase foreign exchange at the official rate, could be traded in the swap market
and hence provided additional supplies of foreign exchange at market rates to foreign
investors.   The exchange system was further liberalized in 1994 with a single
exchange rate determined in an interbank market, the foreign-owned firms being
allowed to hold their foreign exchange receipts in foreign currency accounts and the
requirement to obtain approval for the purchase of foreign exchange for trade and
trade-related transactions being abolished.
2.3 Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was done to establish the statistical significance of the
determinants of DFI in China as discussed in the preceding sections.   Host country
variables included in the equation are China’s GDP gr wth rate (CGDP) to represent
the market size, the ratio of China’s wage rate to ASEAN wage rate (WR) to represent
the cost advantage of China, the exchange rate (XR) to capture exchange risk factor,
and a dummy variable (DUM) for the policy factor.  The world GDP growth rate
(WGDP) is used to depict the supply of outward investment funds.  The regression
results are summarized in Table II.7.  DFI inflows in China are positively related with
China’s GDP and world GDP; and negatively related with the wage ratio, as
hypothesized.  The sign of the exchange rate coefficient is positive, implying that
devaluation encourages inflow of DFI, a result consistent with previous empirical
studies.26    The effects of CGDP, WGDP and the exchange rate are shown to be
statistically significant.
3. China’s Outward Investments
Both push and pull factors influence decisions of Chinese businesses to invest
overseas.  One push factor at work since the early 1990s is the Chinese government’s
encouragement of such overseas undertaking manifested through public
pronouncements and through sponsorships of seminars and workshops aimed at
educating and assisting potential overseas investors.   With the explosive growth of the
Chinese economy in the 1990s, Chinese enterprises are able to realize huge profits and
generate excess funds for overseas investments.  In order to strengthen them further, the
Chinese government is pushing them to set up subsidiaries abroad.  Overseas operations
enable the Chinese firms to acquire information on foreign technology and markets, and
be familiar with and exposed to international competition.
Foreign exchange ontrols  in China have also served as push factors for
outward DFI.  The inconvertibility of the Chinese currency prompted Chinese firms to
set up subsidiaries overseas to retain earnings in foreign currency.  Though this
motive has diminished in importance with the new policy of full convertibility of the
renminbi, Chinese firms have continued to use their subsidiaries to avoid the long
application procedure for remittance of foreign currency out of China as well as other
administrative controls regarding use of foreign currency.
Table II.7 Regression Results:  Factors Affecting DFI Flows in China
Variable Run 1 Run 2
Constant -290.82
*(-2.07)
-293.93
(1.91)
CGDP 6.01
*(2.07)
7.01
*(2.25)
CGDP(-1) 1.30
(0.42)
-0.11
(-0.03)
WGDP 54.81
**(10.84)
52.71
**(9.86)
XR 24.44
*(2.16)
22.42
(1.82)
WR -30.95
(-1.50)
-166.32
(-0.25)
DUM -246.63
(-0.41)
R2 0.98 0.97
F **34.92 **34.27
Notes:Number of observations = 13, t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at the 10 % level of confidence
** Significant at the 1 % level of confidence
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There also exist microeconomic, firm- and industry-level, push factors.   China
has competitive advantage in certain production technologies such as that of the
defense industry.   A specific example of this push factor at work is the case of
Northern Industry, a conglomerate under the Ministry of Defense.   An army tank
assembly plant in Malaysia was set up by Northern Industry.  It has also diversified
into civilian industries, applying the same technology in its metal-processing plant in
Singapore.27
Host-country variables influencing China’s outward DFI include market,
profit variables (cost and price), and policy factors.  Market reasons are of various
forms and degrees.  One is to improve shares in the foreign markets.  A number of
Chinese manufacturing firms establish marketing and distributing firms in their export
markets to have better control of distribution channels for their goods so as to increase
their market shares.  China Southern Glass Co. utilized this marketing strategy in the
United States and Australia.   A second market-oriented pull factor is penetration of a
regional market.  A pharmaceutical conglomerate in Shenzhen ch s  to locate in
Thailand because it was eyeing the triangle region of Thailand-Cambodia-Burma for
its market.  The promotion of exports of capital equipment from China is another
market-related factor.   A ish processing firm was set up in Africa with Chinese
capital with the secondary objective of exporting fishing vessels from China.
In the case of China’s outward DFI, cost savings arise mainly from raw
materials and transportation, not labor,  cost components.    Though China is a country
abundant in natural resources, it is deficient in certain natural materials such as rubber
and timber.  Hence, Chinese firms locate in countries where their essential raw
materials in short supply in China can be sourced most easily and  cheaply.  A
Chinese cosmetic factory, for instance, is in Thailand because of its abundant supply
of the essential oil used in cosmetic production.  Another Chinese firm, a furniture
factory, is also in Thailand because of its rich timber resources.  A third example for
this resource factor is the Chinese-invested fish processing plant in Alaska.
For distant foreign markets such as the United States and/or for certain bulky
goods (relative to the price), transportation cost becomes a major component of cost
and this becomes an incentive for investing in the export market.   The bottling plant
in the United States owned by a Chinese beverage factory falls under this category.
This is also the case for the health drink plant put up in Thailand by a Chinese
pharmaceutical firm.
The second profit variable, price, is something specific to China’s present
position in the world market.    Some Chinese businesses establish subsidiaries abroad
because their products command higher prices when manufactured elsewhere.   This
is the reason cited by a Chinese thermos factory and a Chinese battery manufacturer
for locating in Hong Kong.
The policy factor is significant for many Chinese investors in African and
North American countries which offer generous packages of tax incentives.  Chinese
capital also enter countries with discriminative trade policies.  To avoid the high
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import tax on rubber shoes in Malaysia, for instance, a joint venture rubber shoe
factory was set up in Malaysia.  In Mauritius, a garment facto y wa  acquired by a
Chinese investor to circumvent the quota restrictions of the United States for China’s
garment exports.28
4. DFI Flows Between China and the Philippines
4.1 Philippine Investments in China
Among the ASEAN-4, the Philippines was the first to take note of the
potential of China.   One of the earliest investors from the Philippines, one of the four
set up before 1988, was San Miguel whose target was the large domestic market of
China.  As with other ASEAN countries, a significant proportion of Philippine
investors in China are ethnic Chinese.   The economic and peace and order conditions
in the Philippines appear to encourage these Chinese Filipino investments in the
Mainland.  Filipino Chinese began to  invest i China during the economic crisis
years of the mid-1980s following the Aquino assassination of  1983.  The period
coincided with the rapid liberalization of the Chinese economy which offered
prospects  for higher returns on investments.   In the early 1990s, the series of
kidnappings in the Philippines that victimized a large number of ethnic Chinese
pushed many of the Chinese Filipinos into bringing their capital as well as their
children to China.   An international school was even set up by Filipinos in Xiamen to
cater to the educational needs of Chinese Filipino children sent there for security
reasons.29 The peace and order problem was coupled by the acute power shortage that
plagued the Philippines at about the same time.  These explain to a large extent the
peaking of Filipino investments in China in 1993.
China’s growing economy and policy variables such as the generous foreign
investment incentives and the development of the Xiam n SEZ i  Fujian have served
as the pull factors for Chinese Filipino investments. Chinese Filipinos have invested
in manufacturing, real estate development, hotels, department stores and banking in
anticipation of huge short- and long-term profits.  Most of the Chinese Filipinos still
have relatives in Fujian.  The Chinese Filipinos capitalize on transactional costs
advantages  arising from cultural familiarity and kinship ties, referred to as “homeland
mentality”  by some political economy experts in the Philippines. The most successful
of the Chinese Filipino investors are those with big capital such as Tan, Sy, Ty and
Gokongwei.  The small- and medium-sized investments are reportedly not earning
much or just surviving because of fierce competition.  They remain to be in China,
though,  because of their relatives there.  Chinese Filipino investors, both small and
big, claim that one of the reasons for their investments in the Mainland is for them to
be of some help to their “homeland”.30
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4.2 Chinese Investments in the Philippines
China started to generate some excess funds that could be channeled into
overseas investments and its government began to be liberal and to a certain extent
supportive of such external undertakings in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the
period during which the Philippine economy was stagnating while those of Thailand
and Malaysia were on the upswing.   Accordingly, Chinese capital surged into the
direction of Thailand and Malaysia and trickled only in the Philippines.   Hence, from
1979 to 1996, China’s statistics recorded only 29 counts of approved investments to
the Philippines.  The Philippine Board of Investments (BOI) records, likewise, reveal
very limited investments from China, with  figures not significantly different from
zero until 1988.  From 1990 up to the end of 1993, BOI listed only 6 approved
Chinese-funded investments, all of which except for one—the New Philippine-China
Group Development Corporation, were small-sized investments amounting to less
than US $ 500,000.  The unstable political and economic environment in the
Philippines during the period scared foreign investors away, including the Chinese.
Investments from China began to pick-up in 1994 as the Philippine economy showed
signs of recovery and stability.  In his year, two large-scale Chinese-funded
investments were approved by the BOI.  Both were power generation projects,
reflecting the needs of the Philippine market at that time and the comparative
advantage of China (relative to the Philippines).  It was also in 1994 that government-
initiated business delegations from China visited the Philippines.  In January of that
year, a business mission led by Deng Xiaoping’s son-in-law explored investment
opportunities in the Philippines in the areas of finance, construction materials and real
estate.  That was followed by a visit of China’s Minister of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation and other top ranking economic officials in October.
Exploratory business missions continued to arrive in the Philippines in the succeeding
years.  There were expressed interests in the areas of port development, cement
production and appliance manufacturing.31
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III
Effects of Direct Foreign Investments in China
1. Export Expansion
The Product Cycle Model provides a dynamic framework for the link between
trade and foreign investments.   In the initial stage of the cycle, the product, developed
and produced in a developed country, is exported to a less developed economy.     As
the product becomes standardized and its markets in the less developed country
expand, the product is produced in the less developed country through DFI for local
sale.  Over time, cost advantages  in the less developed country  result in the closure
of capacity  for the product in the developed country (which moves on to new
products) and the product is exported from the less developed country to the
developed country.32
In line with the Product Cycle Theory, Kojima argues the trade-orientedness
of Japanese outward foreign investments.    He argues that direct foreign investments
that result in the orderly transfer of industries from countries losing comparative
advantage to those countries which still possess advantage in such industries are
trade-creating and welfare-enhancing for both investing and host countries.33
In the case when DFIs in export-oriented production are particularly
encouraged, the simple production theory explains the positive correlation between
direct foreign investments and exports.  The introduction of superior production
technologies through DFI works towards increasing the competitiveness of the host
country’s exports in the world market.
Export-oriented foreign investments are particularly encouraged in China to
ensure the continuous supply of foreign exchange necessary to sustain economic
growth.  Has China been successful in directing investments to export-oriented
industries?  The following table reveals the impressive expansion in China's exports.
From 1984 to 1996, total export receipts of China increased almost six-fold from only
US $ 26 billion to US $ 151 billion, growing at an average rate of 16 percent per year.
Exports of foreign-invested enterprises grew at a much faster rate of 74 percent per
year on the average so that by 1996, exports of foreign-invested enterprises was more
than 500 times the 1984 level.  The rapid growth of DFI exports was remarkably
sustained until 1996 despite the abrupt deceleration in over-all export performance
during the year.     Consequently, the share of foreign-invested enterprises in China's
exports rose continuously from less than 1 percent in 1985 to a substantial 41 percent
in 1996--nearing half of China's export receipts.
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Table III.1 Exports of Foreign Invested Enterprises in China
Total Exports DFI ExportsYear
US $
Millions
% Growth
Rate
US $
Millions
% Growth
Rate
Ratio (%)
DFI
Exports
To Total
1984 26,140 115   0.4
1985 29,091 11.3 320 178.3   1.1
1986 30,683   5.5 480   50.0   1.6
1987 40,147 30.8 1,200 150.0   3.0
1988 47,308 17.8 2,460 105.0   5.2
1989 59,277 25.3 4,920 100.0   8.3
1990 62,400   5.3 7,800   58.5 12.5
1991 72,024 15.4 12,100   55.1 16.8
1992 85,294 18.4 17,400   43.8 20.4
1993 91,782   7.6 25,240   45.1 27.5
1994 121,010 31.8 34,713   37.5 28.7
1995 148,780 22.9 46,876   35.0 31.5
1996 151,060   1.5 61,506   31.2 40.7
Average 16.1   74.1 15.2
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook
A regression run of total exports versus the amount of inward investments in
China reveals a significantly high correlation coefficient of 90 percent.  The result
also indicates a significant positive effect of foreign investment inflows on exports—
every US $ 1 of DFI inflow generates US $ 2.55 of exports:
Regression Results: Dependent Variable = Exports
coefficientt-statistics
constant 41,683.64 7.41
DFI 2.55 9.44
R-squared 0.8998
F 89.7847
2. Capital Formation
Direct capital inflows, as a source of investment funding, have the potential to
increase income via the supply and demand sides.  On the supply side, DFI  imply
expansion of capital stock and hence, an increase in the productive capacity of the
economy. DFIs are also often associated with technology transfer in both production
and management which results in more efficient use of productive resources.  The
expansion in demand for capital goods coming from foreign investors may not be
substantial as a significant portion of their capital requirement may be imported.  DFI,
however, may lead to the development of supplier industries (backward linkages) and
may likewise stimulate increases in other expenditure items (forward linkages) such
as consumption (through its employment-generation effect) and exports (for export-
oriented DFI).
The supply-side effect of foreign investments may be the dominating factor in
income growth relative to the demand effect.  DFIs are tantamount to capital
formation and hence, expansion in the productive capacity of the economy.  A
spectacular build-up of capital has taken place in China since it opened its doors to
foreign investors.  Gross capital formation expanded 13 times from only RMB 200
billion to RMB 2.7 trillion, an average annual growth rate of 23 percent.   That DFIs
contributed  substantially to this capital build-up is clearly reflected in the increase in
the ratio of DFI to GCP (third column of Table III.2).  From a negligible share of 0.3
percent during the early years of the “Open-Door” policy, the share of foreign
investors in capital formation in China continuously increased to 15 percent in 1994.
DFIs’ share in China’s capital expenditures remained substantial despite the slow-
down in the inward flow of foreign investments in the mid-1990s.
Table III.2 Contribution of DFI to China’s Gross Capital Formation
Year Utilized
DFI Inflows
(Y Billions)
Gross Capital
Formation
(Y Billions)
GCF
Growth Rate
(%)
Ratio of
DFI to GCF
(%)
1979-1982     2    640   0.3
1983     1    200   0.6
1984     3    247 23.5   1.2
1985     5    339 37.2   1.4
1986     6    385 13.6   1.7
1987     9    432 12.2   2.0
1988   12    549 27.1   2.2
1989   13    609 10.9   2.1
1990   17    644 5.7   2.6
1991   23    752 16.8   3.1
1992   61    964 28.2   6.3
1993 159 1,500 55.6 10.6
1994 291 1,926 28.4 15.1
1995 313 2,388 24.0 13.1
1996 347 2,687 12.5 12.9
Average 22.8   5.0
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1998
3. Employment
The effect of foreign investments on the over-all employment picture in China
can only be minimal as they account for less than 1 percent of total employment and
just about 2 percent of urban employment.  Nonetheless, direct foreign investors have
made important contributions to job creation in China.  With the investment boom of
the early 1990s, employment in foreign-funded enterprises increased by 30 percent in
1993 and another 41percent in 1994.  The impressive record continued until 1995
during which DFI employment grew by 26 percent.   By 1996, there were a total of
5.4 million jobs generated by foreign-funded enterprises, more than double the jobs in
1992 of 2.2 million.  Consequently, the share of FFEs to total Chinese employment
rose from 0.3 percent in 1992 to 0.8 percent in 1996 while their share to urban
employment increased from 1.3 to 2.7 percent.
The expansion of employment associated with DFIs be omes more significant
if put in the context of contracting employment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
urban collectives.   Indeed, foreign enterprises have helped absorb redundant labor
displaced with the gradual rationalization of SOEs and urban c llectives whose share
to over-all employment figures had accordingly dropped.  Table III.3 further reveals
that workers of FFEs are better paid than those of SOEs and urban collectives.
Generally, wages in FFEs are twice those of urban collectives and 50 percent more of
SOEs.
Table III.3 Employment and Average Wages in China
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Ave.
Employment (10,000 persons)
Total 65,55466,37367,19967,94768,850
Rural 48,31348,7848,78648,8549,035
Urban 17,2417,58918,41319,09319,815
   State-owned 10,88910,92011,21411,2611,244
   Urban Collective3,6213,3933,2853,1473,016
   Foreign-funded 221 288 406 513 540
   Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan
83 155 211 272 265
    Others 138 133 195 241 275
Average Wage (Yuan)
Urban 2,7113,3714,5385,5006,210
   State-owned 2,8783,5324,7975,6256,280
   Urban Collective2,1092,5923,2453,9314,302
   Foreign-funded
   Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan
4,7405,1476,3767,4848,334
   Others 4,3475,3156,5338,0589,383
Employment (Share to Total, %)
Total 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Rural 73.7 73.5 72.6 71.9 71.2 72.6
Urban 26.3 26.5 27.4 28.1 28.8 27.4
   State-owned 16.6 16.5 16.7 16.6 16.3 16.5
   Urban Collective5.5 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.9
   Foreign-funded 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6
     (Share to Urban, %)1.3 1.6 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.1
     (Growth Rate, %) 30.3 41.0 26.4 5.3 25.7
Average Wage (Proportion of Urban Wage, %)
Urban 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
   State-owned 106.2104.8105.7102.3101.1104.0
   Urban Collective77.8 76.9 71.5 71.5 69.3 73.4
   Foreign-funded
   Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan
174.8152.7140.5136.1134.2147.7
     Others 160.3157.7144.0146.5151.1151.9
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1998
Regional wages given in Table III.4 likewise indicate wage gaps between
FFEs and non-FFEs.  In the SEZ regions and the coastal cities where most DFIs are
located (85 percent), wages are above the over-all average.  Shanghai, Beijing and
Guangdong with three of the five SEZs off r th highest wages in China.   Wages in
the interior regions which account for just 15 percent of DFIs are 10 to 30 percent
lower than the over-all average.
Table III.4 Average Wages in China by Region, 1996
Wage
(Yuan)
Proportion
of Total (%)
Total 6,210 100.0
Special Economic Zones Region7,096 114.3
   Guangdong 9,127 147.0
   Fujian 6,684 107.6
   Hainan 5,476   88.2
Beijing and Coastal Regions6,691 107.7
   Beijing 9,579 154.3
   Tianjin 7,643 123.1
   Shanghai           10,663 171.7
   Liaoning 5,269   84.8
   Hebei 5,286   85.1
   Shangdong 5,809   93.5
   Jiangsu 6,603 106.3
   Guangxi 5,397   86.9
   Jilin 5,370   86.5
   Heilongjiang 4,564   73.5
   Zhejiang 7,413 119.4
Interior Regions 5,084   81.9
   Shanxi 5,183   83.5
   Inner Mongolia 4,716   75.9
   Anhui 5,175   53.3
   Jiangxi 4,852   78.1
   Henan 4,924   79.3
   Hubei 5,099   82.1
   Hunan 5,100   82.1
   Sichuan 5,156   83.0
   Guizhou 4,917   79.2
   Yunnan 6,231 100.3
   Tibet 1,087   17.5
   Shaanxi 4,882   78.6
   Gansu 5,882   94.7
   Qinghai 6,513 104.9
   Ningxia 5,635   90.7
   Xinjiang 5,987   96.4
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1998
4. Income Growth
The two decades of the 1980s and the 1990s witnessed the rapid growth of the
Chinese economy that stemmed from the country’s “Open-Door” polic .  From 1978
to 1996, real GDP grew by 444 percent.  On a per capita basis, real GDP in 1996 rose
to more than four times the 1978 level.   Industry, the sector housing much of the
DFIs (about 70 percent), led this growth, expanding by 674 percent during the period.
Construction, which was opened to DFIs i  1991 and which made a major
contribution to the unprecedented investment of the early 1990s, grew by 548 percent.
Primary industries comprised about 25 percent of China’s GDP but received only 2
percent of DFIs.  The primary sector grew by only 146 percent during the period.
Table III.5 gives the yearly growth rates of GDP and DFI.   High GDP growth
rates are accompanied by high DFI growth rates.  The years during which China’s
GDP grew at double-digit rates coincide with years of massive DFI inflows, 1984-
1985, 1987-1988 and 1992-1994.  The first big waves of foreign investors arrived in
China after laws and guidelines governing DFIs w re formulated in 1983 and 1984.
The entry of large multinationals from Europe and the United States triggered a
bandwagon effect in 1984 and 1985.   The second wave came in 1987 and 1988  as
generous incentives were offered to foreign investors for the first time.   The third
investment boom, unparalleled  by the first two, led to three consecutive years of very
high growth.   Increase in direct foreign investment inflows were sustained, albeit to a
less degree, after 1994.  Remarkably, GDP growth, though also lower, remained
impressive.
Table III.5 DFI (Utilized Amount) and GDP Growth Rates (%)
Year DFI GDP
1984   97.8 14.6
1985   32.0 13.5
1986   12.8   8.3
1987   23.5 11.6
1988   38.0 11.3
1989     6.2   4.1
1990     2.8   3.8
1991   25.2   9.2
1992 152.1 14.2
1993 150.0 13.5
1994   22.7 12.6
1995   11.1 10.5
1996   11.2   9.6
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook and Almanac of China’s Foreign Trade and Relations
Data on per capita GDP by region are likewise reflective of the role played by
DFI in China’s economic growth.   Per capita GDP in Shanghai, second only to
Guangdong as recipient of DFI, was almost four times the national average.   Beijing
and Tianjin, a coastal city, recorded per capita GDP in 1996 more than double the
over-all average.   Guan dong’s and Fujian’s, home to the first four SEZs, were about
50 percent higher.   In general, coastal regions posted per capita GDP above the
national average while those of the interior regions fall short of the average.
Table III.6 Per Capita GDP by Region, 1996
Per Capita
GDP (Y)
Proportion of Total
(%)
Total   5,634 100.0
Special Economic Zones Region  7,716 137.0
   Guangdong   9,513 168.8
   Fujian   8,136 144.4
   Hainan   5,500   97.6
Beijing and Coastal Regions  9,370 166.3
   Beijing 15,004 266.3
   Tianjin 12,270 217.8
   Shanghai 22,275 395.4
   Liaoning   7,730 137.2
   Hebei   5,345   94.9
   Shangdong   6,834 121.3
   Jiangsu   8,447 149.9
   Guangxi   4,081   72.4
   Jilin   5,163   91.6
   Heilongjiang   6,468 114.8
   Zhejiang   9,455 167.8
Interior Regions   3,783   67.1
   Shanxi   4,220   74.9
   Inner Mongolia   4,259   75.6
   Anhui   3,881   68.9
   Jiangxi   3,715   65.9
   Henan   4,032   71.6
   Hubei   5,122   90.9
   Hunan   4,130   73.3
   Sichuan   3,763   66.8
   Guizhou   2,093   37.1
   Yunnan   3,715   65.9
   Tibet   2,732   48.5
   Shaanxi   3,313   58.8
   Gansu   2,901   51.5
   Qinghai   3,748   66.5
   Ningxia   3,731   66.2
   Xinjiang   5,167   91.7
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook 1998
To further establish the extent of the contribution of direct foreign investments
to China’s growth, a  model that specifies output growth (CGDP) as a function of the
production inputs: the growth rate of labor (L), the investment rate (GCF/Y) and
technology (represented by the constant term) is formulated.  To isolate the effect of
direct foreign investments, capital formation (GCF/Y) is segregated into domestic
savings (S/Y) and foreign inflows (DFI/Y).   The results of the regression runs are
given in Table III.7.   The first estimated equation shows the significant positive
effects of labor growth and capital formation on China’s GDP growth.  The
magnitude of the coefficients reflects the relatively stronger impact of capital
formation on China’s growth.  For every 1 perc nt point increase in the investment
rate, China’s GDP growth rate increased by 2.4 percent points on the average during
the period considered.  The second equation which separates the effect of direct
foreign investments reveals that much of the growth impact of capital formation was
contributed by direct foreign investments.   The coefficient of domestic savings rate in
the second equation, although positive, is statistically insignificant.   The coefficient
of DFI/Y, on the other hand, is highly significant and strongly positive (slightly
higher than the coefficient of the rate of capital formation).   A value for the
correlation coefficient of around 0.50 is expected as the model has not been specified
to capture all the factors that affect GDP growth.  Demand variables, for instance, are
not entered into the model.   It may be necessary to note here that DFI, also shown to
be greatly contributing to exports, is expected to have indirect income effects via the
export demand effect.
Table III.7 Regression Results:  Effect of Inward DFI on China’s GDP Growth
Variable Run 1 Run 2
Constant -31.70
**(-2.27)
-22.82
(1.43)
L 0.96
**(2.88)
1.30
**(2.87)
GCF/Y 2.41
**(2.88)
S/Y 0.66
(1.55)
DFI/Y 2.79
**(3.11)
R2 0.48 0.54
F ***5.15 **3.90
Notes:Number of observations = 14,  t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at the 10 % level of confidence
** Significant at the 5 % level of confidence
*** Significant at the 1 % level of confidence
IV
Summary and Conclusions
The objectives of Chinese authorities in opening the country’s door to foreign
investors were many-fold.  Taking off from a very low inc me base in 1979, domestic
savings were not sufficient to fuel growth.  Nor were its reserves of foreign exchange
adequate to finance imports of capital goods and production inputs necessary to
increase productivity and expand output. Foreign investors were also expected to
introduce new management and production technologies that would make China
internationally competitive.  Further, the promotion of foreign investments
particularly in export-oriented sectors was aimed at ensuring, not just a one-time, but
a continuing flow of foreign exchange into the country.   Has China been successful in
achieving these objectives?
Since the enactment of the Equity Joint Venture law in 1979, big waves of
foreign investments have arrived in China.   From 1979 to the end of 1996, a total of
US $ 175 trillion capital had actually been invested in China by foreign entities.  This
figure was just less than half of the total pledged amount  US $ 469 trillion.   The
rate of growth of DFI was extremely impressive—an annual average of 57 percent in
terms of contract amount and 45 percent in terms of utilized amount.  By 1996,
inflows of direct foreign investments were 275 times of 1983’s level.
A number of internal and external factors contributed to this remarkable
record.    Opportunities offered by China’s potentially expansive market was an
important drawing force for direct foreign investments.   The market size factor
represented by the rate of growth of the Chinese economy was shown to have a
statistically significant positive effect on inward DFI in China.  China’s abundant
supply of low cost labor was a pull factor for the early small- to medium-scale export-
oriented overseas Chinese  investors.34    The regression analysis further revealed that
the devaluation of the renminbi had a significant positive effect on DFI.  The
favorable influence of economic-related variables in China was greatly enhanced by
policy variables.  Policy played a catalytic role in attracting foreign investors to
China.  The package of incentives offered to foreign investors in special zones
matched and even surpassed those offered by competing economies such as the
ASEAN-4.  Chinese authorities manifested much sensitivity to the needs of foreign
investors.  Liberalization of trade and foreign exchange policies in China had evolved
largely in response to and in accordance with the concerns of DFI.  By the start of the
1990s, the world had been convinced of China’s commitment to its “Open Door”
policy and to the establishment of a politically and economically conducive business
environment and hence, the unprecedented investment boom of the early 1990s.
External factors were likewise at play in the investment boom in China.
Economic conditions in the source countries dictated the available supply of funds for
outward investments.  As a general indicator of this factor, world GDP growth rate
was included as one explanatory variable in the DFI equation.  The relationship turned
out to be strongly positive.  A sizeable proportion of investments in China came from
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Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.  The accumulation of trade surpluses in these
countries in the late 1980s up to the early 1990s made available the foreign exchange
that was recycled into DFI outflows to China.  These capital movements were
facilitated by improved political relations of these primary source countries with
China.
A host of other non-economic and non-policy factors explained foreign
investments in China.  Historical, cultural and geographical affinity made the
transaction costs of business in the Mainland lower for overseas Chinese.  This was a
relevant motivational factor for investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan which
accounted for 60 to 70 percent of DFIs in China as well as for the ethnic Chinese
investors which comprised a significant portion of investments from the ASEAN.
Direct foreign investments flowed massively into China, as hoped. Had DFI
delivered as expected?  The impressive export performance of China, an annual
growth rate of 17 percent, was contributed largely by foreign investors, whose export
receipts grew by 74 percent per year.  In 1996, foreign-funded enterprises produced
nearly half of total Chinese exports, a big leap from their share of less than 1 percent
in 1985.  A spectacular build-up of capital had also taken place in China since the
foreign investors arrived.  Gross capital formation expanded at a rate of 23 percent per
year.   About 13 percent of these capital expenditures were undertaken by foreign
funded enterprises in the 1990s, a sharp improvement from their negligible share of
0.3 percent during the early years of the “Open Door” policy.   It was also shown
statistically that capital formation particularly by DFIs had a significant positive effect
on GDP growth of China which posted double-digit rates in most of the “open door”
years.  These growth records were translated into 5.4 million higher paid jobs in FFEs
which made up for contracting employment in state-owned enterprises and urban
collectives.
With its initial success, Chinese authorities appear to be bent on continuing
and expanding the scope of the “Open Door” policy.  Though the tax reforms initiated
in 1994 have aimed at equalizing the tax burden for all domestic and eventually
foreign enterprises, policies towards foreign investors have remained very favorable.
Chinese authorities have even come up with new positive measures for direct foreign
investments since 1998 such as value-added tax exemptions, further simplification of
DFI screening and approval procedures, and guarantee and better protective measures
for DFI interests.35   On several occasions, top ranking officials have publicly
declared government’s intention to further improve the environment for foreign
investments and to invite aggressively DFI.  Furthermore, Chinese authorities have
already started to attract foreign investors to the inland regions.  The central and
western regions of China are now offering DFI incentives that are equivalent and
sometimes better than those in the coastal regions.
Though China too has been hurt by the Asian economic crisis, its toll has been
much less.  The drying up of funds in China’s DFI source countries, mostly Asian,
have resulted in the decline in DFI in terms of contract number and amount since
1996.  Actual DFI inflows, on the other hand,  have start d to slow-down since 1995
but did not decrease in absolute terms until last year, 1998, thanks to the fresh and
                                      
35 Tateishi (1998).
large-scale investments made by European and American transnational companies.
Accordingly, income growth in China has remained solid, a decent 7.8 percent in
1998, despite the deceleration since 1995.
What are the implications of these developments in China on the ASEAN-4
countries?   Has the emergence of China as a host for direct foreign investments
affected foreign capital flows in the ASEAN-4?   There are no indications that DFIs in
China  have crowded-out DFIs in he ASEAN-4.  The  much improved share of China
in the global supply of DFI has not been accompanied by reductions in  the shares of
the ASEAN-4, nor of all developing countries as a group but of the industrial
countries.   The greater magnitude of the  increas in China’s share relative to the
magnitude of the drop in the industrial countries’ share and the positive change in the
global supply of DFI are indicative of new stocks of DFI generated by China’s “Open
Door” policy.  Moreover, China’s opening has presented new opportunities for the
ASEAN-4.  Two-way DFI flows between China and the two ASEAN countries,
Thailand and Malaysia, became important in the early 1990s during which all three
economies were on an expansionary trend.  Remarkably, complementation in several
respects, namely, material endowment, labor skills, technology, and market needs
have been found.  Thai firms have gone to China to escape the rapidly increasing cost
of labor and land in Thailand as well as to penetrate the enormous Chinese market.
Chinese firms, on the other hand, have gone to Thailand for sourcing of certain raw
materials and getting access to a regional market.  Similar examples of active and
profitable cooperation  between China and Malaysia could be cited.  Examples of
flows between China and the Philippines may not be as numerous.   Despite the fact
that the Philippines was the earliest among the ASEAN-4 to invest in China, a
positive trend was not established due to the several crises the Philippines went
through from 1983 up to the early 1990s.  As the Philippines stepped onto the path of
recovery in the mid-1990s and as it has continued to manifest greater resiliency to the
Asian crisis as China, talks of economic cooperation have been initiated.
Government-supported business delegations have been sent between the two countries
to explore opportunities.  Certainly, complementation similar to those with Thailand
and Malaysia exists.
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